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ABSTRACT 
By 1778, the world’s most powerful Empire had failed, for almost four years, to 
decisively end an internal rebellion in its North American colonies.  This failure resulted 
in the escalation to a world war and the British submitting to defeat in 1783.  What is of 
interest is not the international community’s impact on the outcome of the American 
Revolution, rather how the British military continually missed the opportunity to end the 
rebellion in its nascent phase.  Therefore, this research will explore the strategic 
interaction between the British military, the patriots and the American colonists to 
determine what British military commanders’ decisions contributed to these missed 
opportunities, and the ultimate loss of their War for America.  To illuminate what went 
wrong, this research will import the McCormick Diamond paradigm to sift through this 
field of history, framing the strategic decisions, the conditions under which they were 
made and their effects on the overall British effort to quell the colonial rebels of North 
America.   
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“Never let any Government imagine that it can choose perfectly safe 
courses; rather let it expect to have to take very doubtful ones, because it 
is found in ordinary affairs that one never seeks to avoid one trouble 
without running into another; but prudence consists in knowing how to 
distinguish the character of troubles, and for choice to take the lesser 
evil.”  
–Niccolò Machiavelli, The Prince1  
A. SCOPE 
One of the longest and most economically and socially taxing forms of war is the 
insurgency.  History proves that small groups can mobilize support from the masses to 
challenge an incumbent government.  These small groups establish new governments by 
violently ousting the incumbent, and bankrupting strong governments by engaging in 
multi-year conflicts.  The beginning of the United States of America is no exception. 
The 1783 Treaty of Paris formally secured the end of the American Revolution, 
but not before Britain lost thousands of lives and a considerable amount of national 
treasure.  The 19 April 1775 British mission to the town of Concord, an eventual 
catastrophic British failure, initiated the American Revolution.  Yet, the incumbent 
British military commander in North America, as early 1774, was warning members of 
the British Parliament that discontent within the colonies would lead to violence.  
Ironically, not only did General Gage prophesize colonial violence, but he ordered the 
Concord mission serving to inflame the masses to support a revolutionary response.  The 
second major British effort occurred in June 1775, with Gage ordering more than 3,000 
troops to seize Breed’s Hill.  Despite mission accomplishment, the British were unable to 
exploit their success due to sustaining heavy casualties.  These types of British efforts 
continued for eight years, with victories and losses, which ultimately resulted in the 
defeat of the British military, and the creation of the United States of America.  
                                                 
1 Niccolò Machiavelli, The Prince, trans. W.K. Marriot (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1908), 111. 
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B. RESEARCH QUESTION  
How did the British military, the largest and most technologically advanced of its 
time, fail to prevent the growth of the colonial rebellion from 1774–1778?  Important to 
note is the period covered during this research.  Arguably, the rebels’ most vulnerable 
time is these five years due to an incoherent organization and lack of resources.2  As to 
why Britain failed during these years, most students would cite the lack of a coherent 
British national strategy resulting from a factionalized, indifferent, or even sympathetic 
British Parliament, as well as incompetent British military commanders.   
C. PURPOSE  
Renowned colonial era Historian John Shy warns against holding the British 
military commanders at fault, citing that they were competent and that their “few 
mistakes…are the kind of lapses that inevitably occur in every war.”3  Shy further asserts 
that these mistakes, either inevitable or calculated on misunderstandings, are part of a 
greater, more complex environment, and thus he argues that over-focus on the military 
commanders’ role in the conflict is futile.   
However, would the American Revolution have started on April 19, 1775, had 
General Gage cancelled the operation? Would it have ever started if no military 
operations took place?  Would the conflict have lasted eight more years if Bunker Hill 
had been a total British victory (as opposed to pyrrhic) against the newly organized 
colonial army?  These are interesting questions.  Mistakes most certainly do occur in war, 
but which ones inflame the situation and which ones do not?  Of course, tying the fate of 
nations on a singular decision is oversimplification.  However, there is something unique 
about the synergistic effects of multiple decisions and their subsequent effects.  
Specifically, how those decisions cumulatively achieve or fail to achieve a national level 
goal.   
                                                 
2 This year was chosen because of the overt entry of the French army and navy in the actual fighting. 
3 John Shy, A People Numerous and Armed: Reflections on the Military Struggle for American 
Independence (New York: Oxford University Press, 1976), 18. 
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With this in mind, and not focusing on the missed opportunities to deal with the 
disparate rebels prior to 1774, this research asks what could those military commanders 
have done to control the rebels and prevent a worldwide conflagration, ultimately leading 
to more lost blood and treasure for the British Empire.  More specifically, how did the 
British military contribute to the loss of the War for America between the years of 1774 
and 1778?  The criticality of these initial moments and the decisions that shape them goes 
without saying.   
Rather than exploring the nascent phases of the American Revolution at an 
abstract level to answer this question, this research will take the perspective of the British 
military commanders.  Because this case is rich with theoretical explanations, Pulitzer-
prize winning historiographies and years of scholarly work, the information at our 
disposal is limitless and can be drawn upon to ensure all circumstances and information 
surrounding the British military commanders is present, and thus fully form a complete 
picture of the commanders failures.  Furthermore, the intent of this research is to bridge 
the gap between academia and practice using a highly functional theory.  This theory 
provides useful information for military practitioners involved in similar conditions, 
highlights useable models to academics, and helps scope future social sciences theory 
development.4  Therefore, we will attempt to demonstrate a clear and detailed description 
of the type of knowledge military practitioners desire.5 
D. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
To begin, we cite that a counterinsurgency as defined by Joint Publication 1–02 is 
a “[c]omprehensive civilian and military effort [sic] taken to defeat an insurgency and to 
address any core grievances.”6  The same document cites that an insurgency is “[t]he 
organized use of subversion and violence by a group or movement that seeks to 
                                                 
4 Michael W. Mosser, “Puzzles versus Problems: The Alleged Disconnect Between Academics and 
Military Practitioners,” Reflections 8, no. 4 (December 2010), 1. 
5 Alexander L. George, Bridging the Gap: Theory and Practice in Foreign Policy (Washington: 
United States Institute of Peace, 1993), 16. 
6 Department of Defense, “Joint Publication 1–02: Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and 
Associated Terms” DTIC Online, November 8, 2010, http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp1_02.pdf 
(accessed Deceember 1, 2010), 85. 
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overthrow or force change of a governing authority.”7  We determined the conditions 
within the American Revolution—or the American insurgency—are consistent within the 
definitions above. Therefore, we move forward to determine the optimal 
counterinsurgency theory given that our research question addresses how the British—the 
counterinsurgent entity—failed to reduce the colonial rebellion—the insurgent entity.  
A cursory search utilizing any search engine available will provide the researcher 
with multiple theories on insurgent warfare.  Similarly, the expansion of counterinsurgent 
theory literature in the 1960s led academics to determine that simple reverse engineering 
of major schools of revolutionary thought such as Mao Zedong, Che Guevara, Carlos 
Marighella and Karl Marx were no longer viable.  Table 1 identifies the major 
contributors to counterinsurgency theory.  The right hand side of the table cites this 














                                                 
7 Department of Defense, “Joint Publication 1–02: Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and 
Associated Terms,” 178. 
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Author Distinguishing Contributions and Strengths 
Galula8 Struggle over “hearts and minds,” where inherent 
strengths of each entity require diplomatic, economic and military 
actions to clear, hold, and re-establish government.  
Krepenevich9 Build organization with strategy in mind, because strategy 
matters. 
Lomperis10 Struggle for legitimacy while focusing on preventing a 
successful insurgency. 
Cann11 Doctrinal flexibility and organization matter. 
Taber12 Obtain awareness of population disparity then reverse 
engineer successful insurgency and attack insurgent weaknesses. 
Nagl13 Institutional learning must be flexible, and adaptive in 
order to achieve indirect and direct strategy victories. 
Kilcullen14 Cultural awareness matters, and must apply relevant 
strategy to incorporate military and civil entities with goal of 
establishing security. 
Thompson15 Government must have a clear political aim, function in 
accordance with the law, have an overall plan, and prioritize 
defeating political subversion. 
Hart16 The indirect approach is the preferred method for waging 
war because it stresses movement, flexibility, surprise that 
disrupts the enemy's psychological and physical balance. 
Table 1.   COIN Theory Contributions 
 
 
                                                 
8 David Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice (Westport: Praeger Security 
International, 1964). 
9 Andrew F. Krepenevich, The Army and Vietnam (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1988). 
10 Timothy J. Lomperis, From People’s War to People’s Rule: Insurgency, Intervention and the 
Lessons of Vietnam (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1996). 
11 John P. Cann, Counterinsurgency in Africa: The Portuguese Way of War 1961–1974 (Westport: 
Greenwood Press, 1997).  
12 Robert Taber, War of the Flea: Classic Study of Guerrilla Warfare (Washington: Brassey’s 
Incorporated, 2002). 
13 John A. Nagl, Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam: Learning to Eat Soup with a 
Knife (Westport: Praeger Security International, 2002). 
14 David Kilcullen, The Accidental Guerilla (London: Oxford University Press, 2009). 
15 Robert Thompson, Defeating Communist Insurgency: The Lessons of Malaya and Vietnam (New 
York: Praeger, 1966). 
16 B.H. Liddell Hart, Strategy: The Indirect Approach (New York: Praeger, 1954). 
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Our intent was not to oversimplify relevant counterinsurgency theories, but to 
assert the individual strengths of each theory.  All the contributions listed above are vital 
and therefore we searched for a theory that posited the aforementioned strengths finding 
them present in a highly pragmatic theory contextualized in a very useable heuristic; the 
diamond, created by Gordon McCormick.  McCormick’s model facilitates analyzing and 
understanding a multi-variant problem in a very simplistic way.17    
At the very heart of McCormick’s theory, is the desire to exercise government 
control over the geographical space in question.  Conflict arises when the values of 
society do not match those of the government.  This disparity polarizes the citizens into 
two general political entities called the state and the counter-state who then vie for 
political control.  Most specifically, the important variables associated with McCormick’s 
paradigm are disparity, structure and strategy.  The following discussion unpacks the 
contents of each variable. 
Disparity plays the central role in creating a polarized population, from which the 
counter-state emerges.  The Historian Chalmers Johnson asserts, “so long as a society’s 
values and the realities with which it must deal are in harmony with each other, the 
society is immune from revolution.”18 Conversely, he writes, “the cause of 
disequilibrium is the failure of homeostatic mechanisms—that is to say, the pressure has 
been so sudden, intense, or unprecedented that it has incapacitated the routine 
institutional procedures and arrangements of a system for self-maintenance.”19  Johnson 
further states that the re-synchronization process occurs when a society’s leaders perceive 
the disequilibrium and act to adjust the reality back to societal values, and that failure to 
perceive or act accordingly, by leaders, can result in the creation of a revolutionary  
 
                                                 
17 Gordon McCormick’s theory of insurgency, discussed in his lectures, is best described in Eric P. 
Wendt, “Strategic Counterinsurgency Modeling,” Special Warfare, September 2005: 2–13.  The following 
discussion captures the major contributions of the theory and lays the groundwork for this research team’s 
analytical efforts. 
18 Chalmers A. Johnson, Revolutionary Change (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1982), 62. 
19 Johnson, Revolutionary Change, 73. 
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organization.20  The final causes of revolution, according to Johnson, are events that 
accelerate or “lead [sic] a group of revolutionaries to believe that the time to strike is 
now.”21 
As such, the insurgents—the counter-state—strike to replace the existing 
authority, and the counterinsurgents—the state—strike back in order to retain authority.  
Both have an inherent initial advantage.  The state’s advantage is force; more specifically 
lots of people, guns and money.  The counter-state’s advantage is information; more 
specifically they are able to maintain secrecy or hide from the state due to their relative 
small size.  To win, either side must incrementally increase their control over the 
geographical space, or retain said control.  To do so, both sides must mobilize support 
from the population and/or the international community to augment their inherent initial 
weaknesses, which also happens to be their opponent’s advantage.  To mobilize, both 
actors must have a structure that employs inputs into valuable growth outputs.  Therefore, 
successful counterinsurgency programs should reduce the outputs of the insurgent 
structure to the point that the insurgent movement itself is no longer capable of growing, 
and must abandon the conflict.   
Simply creating and maintaining a successful structure is only half the solution.  
Correctly directing the outputs of the actor’s structures will prescribe success.  
Understanding that the state has a force advantage, the insurgent intuitively understands 
that direct action is unlikely to be successful (Identified as #3 in Figure 1).  Conversely, 
the state’s probability of locating the insurgent is very small due to their information 
advantage (Identified as #3 in Figure 1).  This reality forces the state and counter-state 
into a struggle over support from the population and the international community 
(Identified as #1 and #5 in Figure 1).  Once either entity achieves greater size, they may 
progressively target the structure (Identified as #2 and #4 in Figure 1), and ultimately the 
actors themselves (Identified as #3 in Figure 1), with better probability.  Therefore, 
successful counterinsurgency programs should employ the correct strategy to maximize 
probabilities of success and increase control of the geographical space. 
                                                 
20 Johnson, Revolutionary Change, Chapter 5: “Revolution.” 
21 Johnson, Revolutionary Change, 94. 
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Figure 1.   McCormick’s Diamond Model.22 
Optimal structure and optimal strategy are the prescriptions for control over the 
population, which aggregately increases probabilities of success for either the insurgent 
or counterinsurgent.  The definition of success is the displacement of the actor’s 
opponent, and the amount of the success depends on the level of control exercised on the 
geographical inhabitants in the end.  Control whether exercised through legitimacy or 
coercion is recognized either as de facto or de jure by the population in a given 
geographical space.  As discussed, insurgencies must mobilize people, armaments, and 
money in order to force the state out, whereas the state must locate the insurgent then 
eliminate him.   
Intuitively, from the counterinsurgent’s perspective, and with the aforementioned 
understanding, the initial phases of an insurgency serve as the most dangerous to 
insurgents.23  This nascent phase begins for the counterinsurgent when the incumbent 
becomes aware of the insurgency, and subsequently acts to counter the insurgency’s  
 
 
                                                 
22 The Figure is the thesis team’s visual interpretation of McCormick’s paradigm and can be found in 
various other forms or fashions. 
23 Gordon H. McCormick and Frank Giordano, “Things Come Together: Symbolic Violence and 
Guerrilla Mobilization,” Third World Quarterly, 2007, 285. 
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efforts.  Furthermore, the nascent phase ends for the counterinsurgent when the 
insurgency is reduced, or when the insurgency has achieved an effective base of 
support.24  
Thus, the decisions and actions by all actors, and the interplay of their effects, can 
inflame the population against the counterinsurgent’s efforts, or complement their efforts.  
Moreover, this nascent phase is generally the time that military units are tasked with 
reducing an insurgency, as was General Gage in 1774.  This research moves forward to 
analyze the decisions made by military commanders during the nascent phase.   
Because the essence of this research is “on explaining a historical[ly] important 
case…[and] exemplify a theory for pedagogical purposes,” we will employ the 
disciplined configurative case study.25  Using McCormick’s Diamond paradigm to 
organize and analyze such a complex situation as the American Insurgency will help 
discern the decisions that exacerbated problems, versus those decisions that were not 
culpable.  Additionally, this research argues not that other hypotheses and theories are 
invalid or weak, but rather that we assume risk in the event that convergent colligation 
does exist—or as we have discussed that it will exist.  In fact, many other time-tested 
theories have been thrown at parts of the American Revolution and had their opportunity 
to tout their assertions.  It is with this in mind that this research team beseeches the 
readers to consider McCormick’s paradigm and give it a chance to discover the faults of 
the British Generals.   
E. ROADMAP 
To achieve this end, Chapter II will provide a historical narrative of the conditions 
on the eve of the American Insurgency.  Surveys of prominent works citing how disparity 
between the British government and the American colonies created the counter-state will 
be the focus of this chapter.  Chapter III will detail the history of General Gage’s attempt 
to subdue the rebellion and Chapter IV will detail the attempts of General Howe.  Both 
                                                 
24 McCormick and Giordano, “Things Come Together,” Third World Quarterly, 300. 
25 Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social 
Sciences (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2005), 75. 
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Chapter III and IV are based on facts alone, organized temporally and centered on the 
major events that represent the clash between the British military and rebel’s various 
structures and strategies.  Chapter V analyzes the strategies of the Generals.  As such, this 
research finds that the Generals faults consisting of underestimation, and mismanagement 
of perceptions, the force, risk, and expectations exacerbated the conflict towards 




















II. POLARIZING EFFECTS OF DISPARITY 
“The liberties of a people never were, nor ever will be, secure, when the 
transactions of their rulers may be concealed from them.” 
—Patrick Henry, Speech to the Virginia Convention26 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The rise of political and economic disequilibrium between Britain and its colonies 
began to take root in the middle of the 18th century.  For the sake of clarity, the year 
1754 witnessed miniscule decay in the harmony between Britain and the colonies that 
began with the rejection of the recommendations put forth by the Albany Congress.  The 
result was homeostatic mechanisms prevailed.  Although relations weakened, harmony 
was re-established and the events of the next eight years—what is now termed the Citadel 
Weakened Wave—facilitated the intermingling of people, organizations and ideas.  Not 
until the Proclamation Act of 1763 was harmony adversely affected.  Then, the sudden 
and unprecedented legislation by Britain, from 1763 until 1765 to regain control and 
conduct Empire cleaning, shocked the colonists.  The disharmony during this time—what 
is now termed the Catalysts Towards Conflict Wave—culminates on the eve of October 
1765.  The Stamp Act of 1765 marks the end of wave two, and simultaneously gives rise 
to the final wave, which is characterized by the colonies leveraging the legal, and 
sometimes illegal, imperial mechanisms to articulate their dissatisfaction.  This Wave of 
Failed Strategies ends on 19 April 1775, when the rebels take to coordinated and violent 
extra-legal means to break from the state. 
As this chapter presents and examines the three waves, the role of disparity will 
become the principle recurrent theme.  More specifically, how disparity led to and 
affected the origins and organization of the different actors involved.  Interwoven with 
disparity are the effects of failed strategies and how such failures added to the differences 
between groups, and set the emergence of the counter-state on a trajectory to violent  
 
                                                 
26 William Wirt Henry, Patrick Henry: Life, Correspondence and Speeches (New York: Charles 
Scribner’s Sons, 1891), 496. 
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confrontation.  The latter portion of this chapter will conclude with a snapshot of the 
population’s preferences and values—something the military commanders would have 
surely known.   
B. CITADEL WEAKENED 
At the outset of the 1750s, the interaction between the colonies and the British 
government was generally favorable.  Trade occurred unhindered, taxes were paid and 
collected, and the execution of day-to-day colonial activities ensued without any major 
upheavals.  However, two major events during the British Supremacy Wave assisted with 
laying the framework for colonial disparity and subsequent organization.  These events 
were the Albany Congress of 1754 and the Seven Years’ War (French and Indian War–
Fourth Inter-colonial War).  
The most important event of the first wave is the Seven Years’ War.  Its effect on 
both the British and the colonists is significant in many regards.  Specifically, the war 
created an economic crisis for Britain and increased the misunderstandings concerning 
imperialism and partnership.  Even more, the long-term military miscalculations arising 
from an overly myopic analysis of interactions during the war between military leaders 
led to unintended and unobserved political mobilization.   
After almost a century of global warfare, Britain’s fiscal strength had ebbed, and 
the country was in a budgetary crisis.  Additional revenue was needed to balance the 
budget, which caused Parliament “to tighten its control over the provinces, commencing a 
more strenuous enforcement of its nearly century-old trade laws and increasing its 
influence over the imperial administrative machinery and colonial currency.”27  The 
ramifications of increased economic scrutiny will receive greater attention during the 
second wave due to such events as the Sugar Act, the Stamp Act and other pieces of 
legislation passed by Parliament, but all economic legislation hereto forward was the 
result of the massive run-up of bills during the Seven Years’ War.    
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The economic burden of sustaining the Seven Years’ War was high, but so was 
the pride of the colonists.  The colonists believed themselves to have carried the larger 
burden in the victory over the French and Indians, and because of that they now had, 
“expectations of imperial partnership.”28 The foundational ideas of “partnership” were 
evident in the way that the British Parliament engaged in an unprecedented cooperative 
effort with colonial legislation throughout the war.29  Conversely, the British postwar 
perspective of the colonies consisted chiefly of reorienting the Empire by returning the 
colonial legislatures to their subordinate position under Parliament.  The confluence of 
these perspectives was not attainable and only fueled each side’s level of disparity. 
The British perception–one of low regard for the military capabilities of the 
colonists - was prevalent and opined by most British observers.   Historian John Shy cites 
Major General James Wolfe, a British officer, as saying the American militias were “the 
dirtiest most contemptible cowardly dogs that you can conceive.  There is no depending 
on them in action.  They fall down dead in their own dirt and desert by battalions, officers 
and all.”30  These preconceived notions about the militias would continue for many years 
and factor into the British war strategy beginning in 1775. 
The British were not the only ones who thought that the colonial military 
performance was wanting; the colonial military leaders thought the same.  However, 
unlike the British, the colonial leaders learned valuable lessons.  As Historian Don 
Higginbotham cites, the Seven Years’ War was a dress rehearsal for the leaders of 
American Revolution.  Experiences with lackluster recruitment, undisciplined soldiers, 
supply shortages and inter-colonial cooperation issues plagued the leaders in the former 
war, but were dealt with more ease in the latter war.31  
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If the Seven Years’ War was a military dress rehearsal for the Continental Army 
leaders, then the Albany Congress of 1754 was the first dress rehearsal for the 
Continental Congress.  The Albany Congress called for a union of the existing twelve 
colonies headed by a Crown appointed president to provide for common defense and 
legislature for the colonies western boundary.  Despite the plan’s ultimate rejection, the 
Albany Congress was “unprecedented in its potential for creating colonial cooperation,” 
and facilitated the coalescing of powerful periphery colonial leaders, many of whom 
would later serve on the Continental Congress.32 
 
 
Figure 2.   British North America circa 1775 
C. CATALYSTS TOWARDS CONFLICT 
The first wave, characterized by weakened relations, abruptly ends with the 
Proclamation Act of 1763.  The issuance of this act and the series of acts between 1763 
and 1765 were unprecedented and pulverized a portion of society into a state of 
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disharmony.  The colonist’s reactions to these acts that they viewed as both escalating 
and patronizing in nature were for the British just simple imperial house cleaning tools.  
This second wave, Catalyst Towards Conflict, despite only spanning from 1763–1765, is 
loaded with a number of key actions that did not resynchronize, but in fact, exacerbated 
the disequilibrium between the state and society and prompted the rise of the counter-
state. 
The intent of the Proclamation Act of 1763 was to organize newly acquired 
British territories, display a non-encroachment posture to the interior Indians in an effort 
to prevent future conflagrations like Pontiac’s War, and facilitate the regulation of legal 
trade.   The act however, angered the colonists by prohibiting them from expanding west 
and decreasing the possibility of obtaining riches.  Furthermore, the colonists saw the 
Proclamation as a rescinding of their imperial partnership, and subordination to the 
Crown’s sovereignty.   Serving as a daily reminder of their subservience to King George 
III was the British Army.  The decision to keep British forces in North America angered 
the colonists, served as a daily reminder of their inferiority, and fostered ill will.33 
To further inflame the colonists’ irritation, the then Prime Minister for King 
George III, George Grenville began to unveil his multi-step program to stabilize Britain’s 
national debt.  The first measure, the Sugar Act, passed in 1764 was not perceived by 
Parliament to be onerous.  Specifically, the act sought to improve customs enforcement, 
establish new taxes for select items, and adjust tax rates for other items.  To the colonists, 
the act was an attack on commerce “that appeared to be in no American’s 
interest…which seemed to threaten the foreign West Indian trade that sustained the 
economies of colonies like Rhode Island.”34  To the individual consumer, this act 
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affected their rights and facilitated an anti-act popular mobilization.35  Fundamentally, 
they believed their right to govern and tax themselves was being attacked.  The colonist’s 
responses and objections to this act and the forthcoming Stamp Act were limited and 
unilateral in nature.  For example the New York Assembly, like that of the 
unsynchronized efforts from assemblies in Connecticut, Massachusetts, North and South 
Carolina, New Jersey and Rhode Island passed resolutions or sent protests to their agents 
in London to assert their position that Parliament had no right to regulate internal taxes.36   
The second and third steps of the Grenville legislation, the Currency Act of 1764 
and the Quartering Act of 1765, added to the ever-increasing division between Britain 
and the colonists.  The Currency Act sought to rid the colonies of all currencies currently 
passing as legal tender.  As for the Quartering Act, it sought to extend proper support to 
British military elements operating in America.  The reverberations from both acts were 
largely financial in nature and to the colonists a harsh attack on their welfare.  Arguing 
the economic disparity between the few prominent colonists and Britain, Charles Beard 
asserted that the strong, unwavering policy put forth by Britain did not bode well for a 
harmonious union with the money-classed, rich colonists, but further assisted with 
enlarging the disparity between the two groups and compelled the same men to act to 
protect their interests.37   
The most significant event to occur contributing to the surging political and 
economic disequilibrium in the colonies was the Stamp Act.  Passed in 1765, the act 
directed, “before any sheet of paper could be used in a court proceeding or sold from a 
press, it would have to carry a small stamp to show that the duty for its intended use had 
been paid.”38  The colonial response to this act, as well as the subsequent interplay of 
action and reaction of the emerging counter-state and Britain, characterize the next wave. 
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D. FAILED STRATEGIES 
The unprecedented and seemingly capricious nature of Britain’s legislation—to 
regulate its Empire—that characterized the second wave prompted both violent and non-
violent protest from the colonists.  These colonial strategies characterize the emergence 
and disappearance of the third wave—the wave of Failed Strategies.  Over the course of 
the next eight years, 1765–1774, both the colonist and Britain’s attempt to repair the 
existing disequilibrium caused their relationship to fray.  Such intent manifested itself in 
several acts and significant events like the Stamp Act Congress, the Declaratory Act, the 
Boston Tea Party, and many others. 
The colonial reaction to the Stamp Act was one of resounding denunciation via 
violent and non-violent means.   For instance, with Patrick Henry’s leadership, Virginia’s 
House of Burgesses passed the Virginia Resolves, which in effect stated Parliament did 
not have the right to tax Virginia.  In other places like Massachusetts, colonists destroyed 
a stamp collector’s office, while nine of the thirteen colonies sent delegates to meet in 
New York as a part of the Stamp Act Congress.   
The consequences of the Stamp Act are many, but none more important than in 
the colonists’ ability to begin organizing themselves publically and secretively–the 
emergence of the counter-state.  The act led to the colonists to create such resistance 
organizations as the Loyal Nine and the Sons of Liberty.  The formation of such 
collective identity groups was a radical departure from the old societal ways versus the 
characterization of Monarchy, patronage and subjects.39  Now centered on collective 
rights these groups sought to achieve freedom from British control.  The Stamp Act 
provided the provincial assemblies with a venue for a new level of cooperation amongst 
all the colonies and above all created an opportunity for the colonists to organize 
politically and overturn the “truncated society”40 that had previously stinted upward  
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mobility of the colonists.  The official voice of this collective political arm embodied 
itself in the Stamp Act Congress, which declared in unison that only colonial assemblies 
could make laws for the colonies.   
The distribution of pamphlets citing that Britain was threatening colonial liberties, 
further coalesced the masses behind anti-British sentiment, and thereby increased the 
ideological disparity.  Bernard Bailyn, in his survey of pre-war pamphlets—the internet 
of the day—argued that liberty was the capacity to exercise ‘natural rights’ within the 
powers set by men through legislation.41  In addition, when the jurisdiction of that 
legislation was threatened, rebellion is logical.42   
Ultimately, Britain repealed the Stamp Act with the passage of the Declaratory 
Act in 1766.  It is a short-lived victory for the colonists and did very little to correct the 
rising level of disparity.  The reason can be found directly from the wording of the new 
act, which stated Britain will retain the right “to have, full power and authority to make 
laws and statutes of sufficient force and validity to bind the colonies and people of 
America, subjects of the Crown of Great Britain, in all cases whatsoever.”43  Parliament 
could not bear to have the colonies believe that it was not the supreme decision maker.  
More importantly, Parliament wanted the colonies to understand it could tax all colonies 
both internally or externally.      
In attempting to re-assert its overall power, Parliament next passes a series of five 
acts, labeled the Townshend Acts, beginning in 1767.  The intent of these acts was to 
establish Parliament’s right to tax the colonies, further enforce colonial compliance of 
trade regulations, punish New York for not complying with the Quartering Act of 1765, 
and allow colonial Governors and judges independence from colonial rule.  The result of 
such legislation was continued agitation of the colonists demonstrating what Historian 
Pauline Maier described as “an important corrosion of that ultimate faith in British rule 
                                                 
41 Bernard Bailyn, The Ideological Origins of the American Revolution (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 1967), 77. 
42 Bailyn, Ideological Origins, Chapter 4. 
43 Henry Steele Commager, ed., Documents of American History (New York: Appleton Century 
Crofts, 1968). 
 19
which characterized the Stamp Act resistance, and which had survived even into the 
opening years of opposition to the Townshend Act.”44  Britain’s strategy to use 
legislation in enforcing obedience was not going to succeed.   
The successful enforcement of the Townshend Acts, ironically, further galvanized 
the colonists and increased their level of opposition to British actions.  The colonial 
response, after the failure of their petitions, was a series of non-importation agreements.  
These agreements, separately established by each colony, were a non-violent means for 
colonists “to recover their liberty, one, moreover, that was legal and seemed to promise 
success.”45  Besides the economic ramifications, the effects of non-importation on the 
colonialists were astounding.  Non-importation led to a widening of the support base 
from within the population.  For organizations like the Sons of Liberty, it led to the 
creation of various local associations that would serve as social compacts, and it 
highlighted how colonial organizations were quickly assuming de facto authority.46  
Despite its partial repeal in 1770, the damage done by the Townshend Acts was 
irreversible and according to Maier, “the colonists had begun to advance along the road 
from resistance to revolution.”47  
The remaining years between the repeal of the Townshend Acts to the beginning 
of 1774 saw increased tensions and a rise in the number of violent and forceful acts in 
opposition to British policy.  First, there was the unforgettable moment in 1770 in Boston 
where British soldiers opened fire on an American mob.  Next, there was the attack on 
the HMS Gaspee, a British customs schooner, carried out in opposition to the unpopular 
British trade regulations.  Last, came the Boston Tea Party in 1773, in which a large 
group of colonists dressed as Mohawk Indians boarded three vessels dumping all tea 
cargo into the harbor.  The actions of the colonists during this period illustrated the on- 
 
                                                 
44  Pauline Maier, From Resistance to Revolution, 114. 
45  Ibid., 119. 
46  Ibid., 14–138. 
47  Ibid., 145.  
 20
going division of ideas and policies between the counter-state and the state.  The ability 
to repair the existing disequilibrium was almost impossible and polarization continued 
unchecked. 
E. POPULAR PREFERENCES 
Certainly, the years and events to this point, before the outbreak of open 
hostilities, had an effect on the population.  What did the colonists prefer and value? 
What follows is a quick survey of what Gordon McCormick calls pure preferences.   Pure 
preferences are defined by McCormick as a person’s choices made based on a preferred 
outcome without regard to the probabilities of that outcome. Conversely, effective 
preferences are choices made based on both the pure preference and the likelihood that it 
will be the outcome.  The following are a survey of pure preferences of colonial America 
circa 1770s; all of which General Gage, with ten plus years of service in North America, 
would have surely known.48   
“Approach the Almighty with Reverence, thy Prince with Submission, thy Parents 
with Obedience, and thy Master with Respect was the conventional advice given to all.”49  
This commonplace advice embodies the notion that colonial society preferred political 
dependence on the Crown.  With that said the colonists believed the principle of self-
government was the founding idea behind the establishment of the colonies in North 
America.50  Rectifying this seeming contradiction was the job of the various colonial 
courts as well as the legislative assemblies.  These were the locations “that local 
communities reaffirmed their hierarchical relationships and reconciled their various 
obligations.”51   
The above advice also supports Historian Gordon Wood’s assertion that “[f]amily 
relationships determined the nature of most people’s lives.”52   A family’s economic and 
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social power was rooted in their land.  The more land owned, the more social and 
economic power.  However, because the geography dictated the relative small size of 
communities, mutual support between the families of a community was essential.  Added 
to this dynamic was the belief that every land-holding family had a right to a share of the 
government.53  The colonial practice of deferring to economic and social superiors 
rectified this seeming contradiction.  In practice, these elites ruled by popular consent.54 
The colonist’s collective preferences—their desire for high social and economic 
status, thereby increasing their political influence via the local courts—were 
fundamentally rooted in their belief in the rights of the individual.  In particular, the 
colonists held in high regard and closely guarded three rights: freedom of religion, 
economic choice, and self-defense.  The foundation of the colonies was not on any 
particular religious allegiance.  As such, the colonists were free “to adopt such mode of 
religious Worship as they liked best.”55  This freedom of choice and practice of religion 
naturally became a guarded belief.  Because the political order of the colonies rested with 
the few who had achieved economic prosperity, what naturally followed was the 
individual desire to choose his economic endeavors.  The dominant economic interest and 
subsequent livelihood of individuals was carrying on trade and shipbuilding in the north, 
producing and selling the product of plantations in the middle and southern colonies, and 
trading in the western portion of all colonies.56  The right to self-defense aggregately 
manifested itself in the local militias.  The local militias, the provincial Governor’s army, 
had prevailed in the previous wars and relied on the volunteerism of individually armed 
men, and thus the militia had become a common collective and individual practice.57    
 
 
                                                 
53 Jack P. Greene, Understanding the American Revolution: Issues and Actors (Charlottesville: 
University Press of Virginia, 1995), 12. 
54 Shy, A People Numerous and Armed, 123. 
55 Greene, Understanding the American Revolution, 13. 
56 Arthur M. Schlesinger, “The American Revolution Reconsidered,” in The Causes and 
Consequences of the American Revolution (Chicago: Quadrangle Book, 1966), 103–114 &106–107. 
57 Higginbotham, The War of American Independence, 7. 
 22
The salience of these rights is embodied in General Nathanael Green’s comment, “It is 
next to impossible [sic] to unhinge the prejudices that people have for places and things 
they have long been connected with.”58  
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III. THE GENERAL GAGE CHRONICLES 
“If you determine on the contrary to support your pleasures, it should be 
done with as little delay as possible, and as Powerfully as you are able, 
for it is easier to crush evils in their infancy, then when grown to 
Maturity.” 
—General Thomas Gage, Letter to Secretary at War, 177559 
A. THE PROPHET RETURNS 
Charged with enforcing what many Americans called the Intolerable Acts—the 
British legislative action taken in response to Boston Tea Party—and restoring security to 
the provinces, General Gage returned to Boston on 17 May 1774.  He arrived to no 
fanfare.  Instead, he inherited a society in the midst of a political, social and economic 
transformation due to the rising tensions between Britain and the counter-state.  Yet, 
General Gage was more than capable of completing the task. 
General Gage was well versed in colonial life.  He presided over, and 
implemented, every major policy decision in the colonies from 1763, until his return to 
Britain in 1775.  His position took him to the farthest outposts in America and constantly 
challenged him as he witnessed the colonist’s disparity grow.  Despite his ten plus years 
of commanding in North America, or his marriage to an American wife, Gage’s loyalty to 
the Crown never diminished.  Gage “believed firmly then in the full sovereignty of 
Britain over her empire,”60 and was quick to employ military forces to solve any problem.   
Thomas Gage purchased his commission into the English Army as a Second 
Lieutenant in January 1741, and grew to be a respected officer who was nicknamed 
“Honest Tom” by his peers.  “In everything [Gage] seemed a composed, persistent man, 
who saw his duty and followed it.”61  In 1754, Lt. Col. Gage was part of a British 
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contingent sent to America to deal with the French forces attacking His Majesty’s troops 
and possessions.  Unknowingly, he would not return to England for over 18 years.   
General Gage’s first battle as a commander was an absolute failure.  While 
leading the vanguard unit of Braddock’s Expeditionary Force to capture Fort Duquesne in 
1755, Gage committed several errors; mistakes that contributed to the overall defeat of 
the British force.  Gage’s failure at the tactical level was the first in a long line of less-
than-stellar performances.  Despite his poor battlefield record, Gage did possess an 
innovative spirit.  In 1757, he proposed, and later created, a light infantry unit that was 
better suited to meet the threats facing the British Army in a woodland environment.  
Additionally, as time progressed, Gage earned the reputation of a politically savvy leader 
who fought bravely in combat.62  
With the issuance of the Proclamation Act, General Gage assumed the position of 
commander-in-chief of British forces in North America.  While in command, Gage came 
to the realization that there was a “fixed disposition on the part of many Americans to 
have it their own way, whether within or without the empire.”63  Perhaps General Gage’s 
comment in 1766 was arbitrary concerning the foreshadowing of the American 
Revolution; or perhaps his observations were more astute than his actions during these 
times may have suggested.  Whatever the case, the British Parliament officially took 
steps to dismantle the colonial rebels—as opposed to restore the equilibrium through the 
political mechanisms that had existed and been the strategy to that point in time.   
General Gage was charged with restoring security to a disequilibriated society.  
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rights,64 correct economic grievances,65 or deny notions of liberty,66 General Gage had to 
act to achieve the political end-state provided him; enforce the Boston Port Act and 
ensure pacification of Massachusetts.67 
B. POLITICAL PROVIDENCE: ONE DOOR CLOSES, TWELVE OPEN 
1. The State Opts for Coercion 
Arriving in May of 1774, Gage brought with him the first of Britain’s Intolerable 
Acts, the Boston Port Bill.  Overall, the acts were the Crown’s punitive response to the 
Boston Tea Party.  This first bill charged General Gage with closing the port of Boston 
until the colony made reparations to the Crown and the East India Company.  Despite his 
intentions to thoroughly carry out the policy, Gage preceded cautiously taking aim not to 
enrage the people who felt unjustly punished for the acts of so few.  Though Gage 
followed all port closure requirements, he did utilize discretion by not choosing to 
enforce an arrest of the bellicose treasurers who refused the act’s stipulations.  Even 
more, he was entirely accommodating to the slow proceedings in the Massachusetts 
General Court, which was convening to determine the process of repayment; so 
accommodating in fact, that he prevented individual payments from concerned Loyalists.  
Nevertheless, fractionalization paralyzed the Assembly and repayment never 
materialized.  Moreover, the next few weeks of June gave rise to a more pressing 
problem.68   
2. The Counter-State Seeks to Mobilize 
On 5 June 1774, rebel Joseph Warren completed his plan to protest the British 
Act.  The Solemn League and Covenant, completed and circulated by the extra-legal 
Committee for Correspondence, called for an immediate ban on trade relations with 
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Britain in protest of the Port Act.  Nevertheless, local Massachusetts’s tradesmen, fearing 
for their livelihood, continued to conduct business as usual.  The rebels, unflinching, 
circulated the idea that the Covenant was gaining support.  Ultimately, the Covenant went 
contested throughout Massachusetts until later in the fall, but the unwavering rebels did 
not stop in Massachusetts and sent the Covenant to the other colonies via Committees of 
Correspondence.69  
Upon receipt of the news of the Boston Port Bill, and news from the Committees, 
other colonial assemblies faced an upsurge in public sympathy for the innocent and 
virtuous Bostonians.  Additionally, some assemblies faced a small but loud radical call to 
immediately support the Covenant.  However, most colonies viewed such action as 
highly ill advisable.  In New York, the council of Fifty-one—the organization created to 
oust the radical influence on the Committees of Correspondence—called for a general 
congress of the colonies to obstruct the radical call for full support.  The rebel’s call for 
immediate action was tempered by the moderate’s call to a congress.70   
As soon as Sam Adams heard that other colonies were favorable to a general 
congress, he strengthened his efforts to unify Massachusetts under opposition.  On 17 
June 1775, Adams hoodwinked the Assembly.  During the initial Assembly meetings in 
June, Adams had secretly garnered support from a majority of Assembly members to 
send a delegation to the general Congress—as recommended by the New York 
Committee of Correspondence.  In a rather juvenile act, Adams locked all Assembly 
members in and called for a vote on whether or not to send the delegation.  Clamor 
ensued and a Loyalist escaped, under the guise of sickness, to inform Gage.  Upon 
learning that the Massachusetts Assembly was gravitating towards the general colonial 
Congress, Gage immediately sent a trusted Loyalist to dissolve the Assembly.  
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Nevertheless, his unilateral and unprecedented reactions were too late.71  Adams had 
secured legal sanction to send the delegation, and then acquiesced to Gage’s direction.72   
3. Gage Acts against the Political Union 
Gage was tirelessly working with moderates to counter the inflammatory actions 
of the rebels in Massachusetts.  However, the slow comings of the Port Bill proceedings, 
and his misinterpretation of the moderates victory in their call for a congress prompted 
Gage to act decisively.  Acting without colonial assembly approval or Britain’s consent, 
Gage, on 29 June 1774, issued a proclamation that identified any signatory to the 
covenant as a criminal.73  
Unsuccessful attempts by Gage to enforce the proclamation characterized the next 
few months.  He attempted to bring charges against radical leaders, but was unsuccessful 
due in large part to the fractionalization of the institutions he was relying on to prosecute 
them–mainly the General Court.  He removed known radicals from military and political 
appointments, and simultaneously attempted to bribe them into moderation.74  However, 
both of these endeavors time and again proved unsuccessful.  
C. POWDER-LESS IS POWERLESS   
1. Gage Builds, then Mounts Forays into the Countryside 
In the wake of his unsuccessful verbal attempts to subdue rebel leaders, Gage 
began to make military preparations for the danger he foresaw.  His writings to General 
Haldimand in New York on 14 July 1774 suggested the inception of a new preemptive 
strategy.  “We are threatened here with open opposition by arms everyday […] I would 
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be prepared against it.”75 His previous communications to Carleton in Canada in late 
June also suggested that a new strategy was forthcoming.  The directions stipulated that 
two regiments from Canada be sent to Boston to augment the five already there.   Gage 
now had approximately 4,000 troops. 
On 1 September 1774, Gage began his new strategy.76  His military would 
systematically disarm the radicals and thus prevent war.  The first attempt was an 
overwhelming tactical success.  At 4:30 a.m., Colonel Madison, at the direction of Gage, 
led 260 men to seize the military stores in Somerville.  They infiltrated by boat from 
Boston through the Mystic River.  Upon docking a half-mile away from the stores, the 
force met the local sheriff and store caretaker, Colonel Phips.  With the Colonel’s 
assistance, the British seized over 250 powder kegs and other military equipment.  The 
operation caught the countryside by surprise, robbing the colonists of what they 
perceived as their stores.  Yet, the rebels did not let Gage’s victory go unchecked.77 
2. The Counter-State Terrorizes and Propagandizes: Gage Capitulates 
Rumors that “war had begun, that six people had been killed, that the King’s ships 
were bombarding Boston” helped fuel the mob attacks on Loyalists in the days following 
Gage’s foray.  Prominent rebels, utilizing propaganda like this, vectored angry mobs to 
terrorize Loyalists working for the state.78  William Brattle, the Loyalist that prompted 
Gage to act on Somerville for fear that the rebels might move the military stores, fled to 
Castle William in fear of his life; he remained a fugitive for his remainder years.  The 
Colonel that provided the keys for the storehouse to the raiding force, David Phips, was 
forced into resigning his political and military positions.  A local, Loyalist Customs 
Commissioner fled a violent mob and never returned to his government job.  Though the 
violence and mob mentality did subside, Britain’s new series of Parliamentary Acts 
scheduled for enforcement was certain to affect the emerging cooler heads. 
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In accordance with the mandates of the Massachusetts Government Act, Gage 
dissolved the Massachusetts Assembly and emplaced a new one; to which the counter-
state responded.  On 27 August 1774, Gage received the new Parliamentary Act and 
immediately began to implement it.79  Though he does notice the protests against the 
enforcement, he was effective at filling the government positions from Loyalists within 
the town of Boston.  In a letter to Lord Dartmouth in late August, Gage astutely pointed 
out that the act and subsequent insertion of placemen inflamed the rebels who had lately 
taken their opposition to the countryside.  Their response was threats; especially to those 
who would support the government.  The medium by which they would deliver these 
threats was handbills (Figure 3: Rebel Handbill circa September 1774).  The rebels’ 
threats did not stop at the door of the Loyalists.  The threats also extended to moderates 
and political neutrals.  These threats took the form of statements like: the state will “take 
your land for the rates, and make you and your children slaves,” and that the Crown 
representatives would “seize your pleasant habitations…your wives and daughter.”80   
 
Figure 3.   Rebel Handbill circa September 177481 
This colonial reaction took Gage by surprise.  It so astounded Gage, that he 
deserted a later attempt to raid the storehouse in Worcester.82  He went even further, 
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when he sent messages to Britain recommending the repeal of the Acts until they could 
be enforced.83  Gage’s nerves were certainly rattled, but there was reason for him to be 
optimistic.  
3. The Counter-State Submits a Petition and Boycotts: Gage Recovers 
Nerves 
The rebels, while trying to utilize the Acts as propaganda to mobilize support 
behind their efforts, had also begun to develop a cohesive political union.  The 
Continental Congress met for the first time on 5 September 1774.  Gage, fully aware of 
their assembly, held the belief that the small outspoken radical delegates from 
Massachusetts would be compelled to accept reconciliation by the moderates of the other 
colonies.84  His belief went unproven. 
September and October again brought disbelief to General Gage.  The Continental 
Congress had fallen into the hands of the radicals.85  At the helm of the Congress, the 
radicals achieved two monumental feats.  The first was a common acceptance on an 
agreement of non-importation.  The second was to develop and transmit their political 
goals via their petition to the King.   
Upon hearing of this unification and boycott, Gage decided to expand his 
disarmament strategy.  Early in December, Gage ordered all colonial officials to stop the 
importation of armaments and to secure all munitions in colonial storehouses.  The rebels 
got wind of this statement and acted first.  On 12–13 December 1774, Paul Revere rode 
from Boston to Portsmouth to warn the Committees of Gage’s intentions and to secure 
the stores from Fort William and Mary before the British arrived.  The Committees acted 
quickly, seizing all munitions from the storehouse on 14 December.  Gage, informed by 
the Loyalist messengers of Governor Wentworth, responded too late.  The relocation of 
all munitions was complete by the time the HMS Scarborough arrived on scene.  Though 
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this was an overt act of rebellion with known participants, Gage did not arrest the guilty 
rebels.  His absolute belief in the laws of the lands, which prescribed for due process 
through the radical influenced colonial courts, prevented his preference for employing the 
military to effect arrests.  Furthermore, this military loss would soon be overshadowed.86    
4. Gage Prompted and Chooses to Raid into Hell 
Upon hearing the news of the seating of the Continental Congress and of the 
failure towards quieting the rebellion, the King and Parliament pushed for more action.  
Lord Dartmouth, writing in late January 1775, directed Gage to act more decisively.  
Dartmouth reminded him that the Governor is empowered to exercise martial law in time 
of rebellion.87  The letter arrived in America as Gage was preparing to launch another 
anti-powder raid.  Feeling supported by his superiors Gage launched a raid to recover the 
stores in Concord.  On 19 April 1775, over 800 elite British troops marched from the city 
of Boston.  The results of the battle between the Massachusetts militiamen and the best of 
the British military resulted in an astonishing British defeat.  The retreating British forces 
from Concord entered Boston only to face another series of on-going problems.88 
D. THE WOES OF ISOLATION 
1. Gage Consolidates 
As early as September 1774, and exacerbated by the Somerville Powder Alarm, 
Gage began and directed “the concentration of troops in places where they would be as 
ready as possible for action in the event of another crisis in relations between the Mother 
Country and the Colonies.”89  For the Soldier this meant moving into tents on Boston 
Common.  The basis of the decision was on two judgments.  The first was self-
preservation, or more simply, that Soldier actions can better be controlled and protected if 
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contained in one area, thus preventing another Boston Massacre, or the threatening of 
isolated troops.  The second is that missions and operations were to be better planned and 
prepared for when necessary.  To further ensure his troops were not put at any 
unnecessary risk, Gage, against the council of his Admiral, opted only for securing 
Boston Neck leaving the more predominant features like Dorchester Heights and Bunker 
Hill unoccupied.90  However, this military reinforcement, or over-consolidation, of 
Boston signaled war to the colonists and that the immediate problems were generated 
from within. 
2. Gage Searches for a Lifeline and Finds Trouble  
The immediate problem resulting from consolidation was the ability to properly 
resource the military force in Boston.  The obvious answer to the problem was to conduct 
foraging operations.  Within striking distance from the Boston Port, the British Navy 
could put out and secure the resources of neighboring islands like Noodle and Hogg 
Islands. (See Figure 4: Boston Map)  On one such endeavor, the Royal Navy schooner 
Diana was lost to the rebels.  It occurred on 27–28 May 1775, when a British foraging 
force encountered elements of the rebel army.  In an effort to cutoff the rebels, the HMS 
Diana was ordered up Chelsea Creek, where she ran aground and was eventually 
overwhelmed, raided and burned by the rebels.  Although this battle resulted in small 
number of British killed, this type of engagement over provisions was the rule and not the 
exception during the siege of Boston.91 
3. The Continental Army Introduces Itself  
A later problem arose when Gage’s decision to over-consolidate met the 
Continental Army, which now held the initiative.  The initial plan to break the siege was 
to attack and secure Dorchester, Cambridge and then Charlestown.  The plan maximized 
British Army strengths against the weaknesses of the rebel defenses.  However, the rebel 
intelligence system intercepted this information.  In early June 1775, the rebels, in 
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preemptive fashion, began to fortify the hills, which were in harassing distance, via 
cannon, to Gage’s troops in Boston as well as his patrolling ships.  The rebel army 
commander, Artemus Ward, had chosen Bunker Hill as his defensive line because it 
commanded both the land and sea routes in every direction.  Yet, on the morning of 16 
June 1775, William Prescott, the rebel’s second in command for the battle, arose to find 
that the first in command for the battle, Israel Putnam had directed the fortification of 
Breed’s Hill.  Presumably from this position, Putnam could range the British lines with 
his cannons.  Therefore, Prescott reinforced Putnam’s redoubt with a defensive line to the 
north of the redoubt completing the rebel’s defensive posture.92 
The British held a war council on the morning of 17 June to determine their 
tactical strategy.  British Major General Henry Clinton proposed a landing to the rear of 
the fortifications.  However, Major General Howe believed that the defensive positions 
were weak and their original plan to land east of Charlestown and roll up the defenses 
was still the most valid option.  Gage believed that putting his army between the rebel 
army at Breed’s Hill and Cambridge broke a maxim and therefore sided with Howe.  
Furthermore, he directed that provisions be taken to follow up their successes with an 
attack at Dorchester.93 
The results of the battle were staggering for the British. Well-known historian, 
John Alden, called the battle, “one of the most sanguinary battles of the eighteenth 
century.”94  The British were tactically triumphant, but at a Pyrrhic cost.  Though the 
rebels’ suffered about 400 casualties, the British reported over 1,000.  The British could 
not afford such a blow for it effectively wiped out any advantages gained from the 
reinforcements that arrived in May of 1775.  The loss of so many soldiers prompted a 
renewed effort to mobilize more resources for the British Army. 
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Figure 4.   Boston Map circa 1775 
E. THE FRENCH AND INDIAN PLAN UNDERMINED 
1. The Scramble for Friends 
As early as August 1774, Gage took steps to secure an alliance with the Indians in 
North America.  The rebels too saw the benefits of securing alliances with the Indians 
and began in earnest to obtain treaties.  The rebels were the first to strike successfully.  In 
April of 1775, the Massachusetts Provincial Congress accepted Indian enlistment into the 
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number—upwards of 13,000—towards the British side due to fear of western colonial 
expansion.96  However, employing the Indians to the benefit of the Crown was a separate 
problem. 
2. Friends Without Benefits 
The story of Guy Johnson, Superintendent to the Indians in North America, 
illuminated why the British were unsuccessful at capitalizing on the numerical superiority 
of their Indian allies.  Appointed in July of 1775 and directed in May of 1775 to mobilize 
the Indians of the Seven Nations to help the Governor and military commander in British 
Canada, Guy Carleton, Guy Johnson was more than successful.97  Johnson arrived in 
Quebec with allies of five of seven of the Iroquois League only to be stifled by Carleton.  
Carleton would allow only limited employment of the Indians under fear of them 
committing atrocities.98  Disgruntled, Johnson traveled to England only to discover he 
was to have no authority in Canada.  However, before hearing this answer, the King’s 
response to the news of the victory at Bunker Hill beat Johnson to the port from where he 
most likely departed.   
F. THE PROPHET RECALLED 
In July 1775 news of Bunker Hill had reached England.  In a matter of days, the 
King recalled Gage.  Receiving word of his recall, Gage’s reflection before sailing home 
to England was not exactly prophetic.  “The Dye is Cast, and tho’ the Rebels have been 
better prepared than any Body would believe, Affairs are not desperate if the Nation will 
exert her force.”99  But were Gage’s prophetic words—at least in terms of Britain’s 
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eventual military exertions—just that, or had his actions taken steps to, in his own words, 
“crush evils in their infancy” and thus prevent escalation to a world war?100    
Gage’s strategy to target the counter-state’s political arm, which manifested in the 
dissolution of the Assembly and subsequent efforts to enforce the anti-Covenant 
proclamation, facilitated the organization of two radical groups.  Meeting extra-legally in 
Suffolk County to avoid dispersal by Gage, the radicals were left unchecked from a 
forceless Gage and adopted the Suffolk Resolves in mid-September. The Suffolk 
Resolves, formally entered into the records of the First Continental Congress, called for 
the adoption of a non-importation agreement and ultimately facilitated the creation of the 
Continental Association.101    
The second radical organization arose when Gage removed radical leaders from 
their political positions.  He escalated to this removal process because his attempts to 
bribe radical leaders went unsuccessful.  This strategy opened the radical’s eyes.  The 
colonists, already angered at British placemen at the time, now collapsed to radical 
pressure to preempt such placement of Loyalists by removing them completely from 
leadership positions.  Nowhere was change more predominant than in the militia in the 
summer of 1774.102  Fearful of the growing Loyalist support to Gage, the radicals 
successfully removed all personnel deemed to be supportive of the Crown from the 
militia. 
Gage’s anti-powder strategy, which manifested in the tactical mission at—among 
other locations—Lexington and Concord, facilitated opportunities for growth for the state 
and the weakening of the counter-state.  However, the critical element for success in this 
strategy was the employment of information operations and operations that mitigated the 
effects of charismatic leaders; both of which Gage failed.  The onslaught of rebel rumors 
circulating via the popular mediums of the time went unanswered by the state.  The rebels 
took advantage of exploiting the population’s fears by manipulating reality to portray an 
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evil empire that was trying to strip the colonists of their liberties, while the state called 
the fighters cowards.  What is more, was Gage’s unwillingness to militarily bring known 
boisterous rebels in because of his strict adherence to law.  Such inaction allowed the 
rebels to hijack the first Congress and compel colonists into action against Britain.103  
Both these shortcomings provided an opportunity for the counter-state to grow, be it 
internal strength around charismatic leaders or in mass support. 
Gage’s strategy of consolidation allowed for the isolation of British forces in 
Boston, limited his tactical options, facilitated the space necessary for the rebels grow, 
and highlighted internal organization problems.  By consolidating his forces in one 
location, Gage made his forces easily observable and the job of pacifying the countryside 
much more difficult.  While pent up in Boston, Artemus Ward and later George 
Washington needed only a small sliver of resources to monitor the British Army.  
Communication to the countryside of any internal British movements occurred very 
easily and quickly.  Furthermore, should Gage act to achieve his goals, he now had to 
accomplish an additional task of breaking through his own created isolation zone.  These 
breakthroughs resulted in foraging battles and the battle on Bunker and Breed’s Hill.  
These battles significantly weakened Gage’s military organization. 
At the same time Gage’s organization was deteriorating, the rebel counter-state 
was solidifying its own organizational structure.  Gage’s provision of space through 
consolidation, allowed the counter-state to begin the process of internal organization.  
This was most evident in the actions of the second Continental Congress in the early 
portion of May 1775.  With the siege in full swing, the Congress created committees to 
run the war effort, and their first unifying action was to appoint George Washington as 
the Continental Army Commander on 14 June 1775.104  The second major action that the 
Congress took was to answer the political inquiries from all the disparate colonies.  An 
excellent illustration of this was the Congress’s response to the Massachusetts 
Assembly’s request to be represented in full by Congress.  Congress’s reply directed that 
Massachusetts organize their own political organization to run its internal affairs, while 
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Congress ran the war effort.  Furthermore, Congress shouldered the colonial union’s 
political desires, which was most evident in the Olive Branch ratified and sent to George 
III on 5 July 1775.105  Though ultimately never read by George III, the petition 
represented a more unified, less ad-hoc type organization. 
While the rebel counter-state was solidifying its organizational hierarchies, 
problems with Gage’s hierarchy resulted in a deteriorating organization.  This is 
evidenced in the absence of the Commander of the North America Royal Navy, Admiral 
Graves, at the war council of 17 June.  Gage’s inner circle of advisors did not bring a 
naval perspective into consideration, a perspective that could have resulted in a radically 
different ending to the battle.  Had Gage included Graves in the war council, a naval 
bombardment of Breed’s Hill would have surely been a recommendation, given that 
Grave’s ships provided bombardment support for the landing army forces.106  In addition, 
had this bombardment occurred, the rebels would have had to withdraw from the hill and 
the Charlestown peninsula.  In this scenario, the battle would have been a total victory, as 
opposed to a pyrrhic one. 
If Gage’s strategy to consolidate highlighted internal problems, then Gage’s 
strategy to mobilize the Indians certainly highlighted external problems.   Though the 
Indians were able to achieve relatively substantial victories for the Crown like those in 
the beginning phases of the siege at Fort St. Jean and in other events recognized by Gage, 
the failures to maximize their friendship can be attributed to the mismanagements of the 
British government.107   The clear lack of authority and direction for Gage, the internal 
structural disarray of the administrative arm due to political patronage, and the general 
feeling of security proved to be major hindrances to Gage’s command.108 
Gage employed these four distinct strategies designed to deny rebel political 
expression, disarm the rebels, and consolidate British forces in order to be prepared for 
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conflict and mobilize support.  The results of the interaction of these strategies with that 
of the rebels’ strategies was perhaps most clear to the next commander.  Gage’s 
replacement would now have to deal with the more effective rebel political and military 
organizations, whose actions more effectively garnered societal support via refined 








IV. GENERAL HOWE CHRONICLES 
“In the course of the great variety of business which fell to my lot, during 
such a wide and extensive command, faults must undoubtedly be 
perceived, but none I hope which can be suspected to have arisen from 
want or zeal, or from inactivity” 
—General Howe, Postwar testimony to the House of Commons,  
April 29, 1779.109 
A. GAGE OUT, HOWE IN 
General William Howe’s military career was marked by courage and competence, 
which explained his favorable standing within the ministry of King George III.  A veteran 
of the Siege of Louisburg in 1758, Howe won commendations for his actions during the 
Battle of the Plains of Abraham, a pivotal battle in the Seven Years’ War.110  After 
defending the battle’s prize, Quebec, Howe commanded an infantry battalion and 
according to his commanding officer, Jeffrey Amherst, it was “the best trained in all 
America.”111   
Howe’s political career, though backed by distinguished family connections was 
less favorable.  As his political career progressed, he was elected to Parliament where he 
represented Nottingham and served as a member of the Whig Party.  During his time in 
government, Howe’s sympathy for America manifested in his open opposition to 
Britain’s colonial economic policy.  Such basis originated from his time spent in 
America, the relationships built, and the experiences shared with such entities as the 
militia and different governing bodies.  Though Howe was sympathetic towards the 
colonists, the lucrative offer of Commander in America could not be passed up.112   
Despite his distinguished military reputation and outspoken political career, Howe 
was not without two notable flaws.  First, it had always been a challenge for him to 
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develop a coherent argument in the House of Commons, a problem that may not have 
only affected his political life, but also his military career vis-à-vis his communications 
skills with subordinates and superiors.113  Howe’s second notable flaw was his 
“overreaching sense of superiority,” concerning his opponents, perhaps even his 
subordinates.114 
Despite his flaws, Howe was placed in command effective 12 October 1775.  In 
the natural course of progression, General Carleton in Canada should have succeeded to 
command.  However, the ministry reverted back to the command structure of 1759 due to 
no land connectivity between Quebec and Boston.  The 1759 plan called for distinct 
commands in each Canada and the colonies.  Howe now commanded everything from 
Nova Scotia to West Florida.115 
Howe ascended to command at a time when the British Army was at its most 
deplorable state as it was pent up in Boston.  Lack of access to local supplies and an 
immobile army in Boston compelled the British Ministry to send an evacuation message.  
Included in this message were orders for Howe to move his force to New York.116  The 
untimely arrival of transport ships prevented the move prior to the onset of winter.   
Besieged all winter at Boston, Howe looked to the spring of 1776 to implement 
his Hudson River Campaign, but the Continental Army had other thoughts.  This plan 
called for a combined offensive from Canada and New York, where Howe would land his 
forces, to strike up the Hudson River separating the New England colonies from the 
middle colonies.  Unfortunately, General George Washington’s desire to strike at the 
besieged British Army manifested in the fortifying of Dorchester Heights, with the 
captured cannons from Fort Ticonderoga, on 5 March 1776.  Though just far enough not 
to be highly accurate, the cannons still proved a threat and Howe planned to attack them.  
Days of uncooperative weather pre-empted the attack and he reconsidered the action.   
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Instead, he very swiftly packed up his entire force and set sail on St Patrick’s Day.   
Howe was bound for Halifax because he did not properly load his force in order to meet a 
possible contested landing in New York.117 
In Halifax, Howe still had specific guidance from Parliament in-hand and he 
continued planning for offensive operations in New York, which was considered a 
Loyalist stronghold and an essential location from which to separate the rebellious New 
England colonies.118  While preparing his forces to move, Howe stated that he, “thought 
a decisive victory over the Continental Army the shortest, if not the only, way to 
peace.”119   
B. ONE DECISIVE BLOW[UP] 
1. Howe Targets the Continental Army 
Howe and his forces arrived and took, without force, Staten Island throughout 
July 1776.  By the end of July, his 32,000 troops and 400 ships—the largest 
expeditionary force of the eighteenth century—was encamped on Staten Island.120  
British morale was high because food was aplenty.  General Howe was just as excited, 
but his happiness stemmed from the welcoming arms of New York’s Loyalists.   
Quite confident he had the most complete information on the rebels due to his 
Loyalist support, Howe finalized and implemented his one-decisive-victory plan.121  The 
strategy designed to defeat the Continental Army once and for all, and destroy George 
Washington began on 22 August 1776.  On this day 4,000 troops via 90 ships landed at 
Gravesend on Long Island, just south of the fortified Continental Army position at the 
Heights of Brooklyn.  Over the next five days, Howe positioned his army, which now 
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totaled 20,000 due to continued transports from Staten Island.  In a surprise move, Howe 
marched half of his army through the night, unbeknownst to the Continental Army, from 
Flat Bush to an eastern town called Jamaica.  By the morning of the battle, the 
Continental Army foolishly believed that they were only about to face 10,000 British 
troops conducting a frontal attack.122 
2. Washington’s Failed War of Posts 
Through the conduct of proper analysis, accurate rebel intelligence, and the 
boundary of Loyalist and Whig supporters, George Washington identified New York as 
Britain’s next objective.123  Washington believed that holding New York was crucial to 
controlling access to the inland waterways as well as securing the colonies.  Bolstered by 
his success at Bunker Hill and determined that holding New York was critical for 
success; Washington developed a defensive entrenchment strategy to counter the British 
offensive–termed the War of Posts by Historian Robert Middlekauff.124   
As British Forces began to transport troops from Staten Island to Gravesend Bay, 
General Washington fortified Brooklyn Heights for the upcoming battle.  Washington 
divided his army in to two elements—one at Brooklyn and the other at the Heights of 
Brooklyn—in order to design his defenses in a manner that was to compel Howe into 
spreading his forces.  More importantly, such a design was meant to prevent Howe from 
being able to apply overwhelming combat power at any one location.  Washington 
however, committed a grave oversight by leaving his left flank unprotected.125 
Howe’s first operation was brilliantly executed.  The initial attack consisted of a 
frontal attack with 10,000 British troops against the 3,000 of Washington’s that had been 
sent out from Brooklyn.  The engagement lasted just long enough for Howe’s troops to 
complete the envelopment of the Continental Army’s left rear after marching in from 
Jamaica.  The Battle for Brooklyn Heights was a British victory that captured over 1,000 
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rebels and trapped another 6,000 rebels in Brooklyn while sustaining minimal 
casualties.126  Following the initial success, Howe elected, against the recommendations 
from General Clinton, to stop the advancing 20,000 troops from storming the Continental 
Army’s secondary redoubts in Brooklyn.  Instead his forces stopped and took time to 
prepare for siege operations.127  That time—48 hours—was all that the defeated 
Washington and his 6,000-trapped troops needed to conduct a complete withdrawal 
across the East River back to lower New York Island-Manhattan. 
 
Figure 5.   New York-New Jersey Map circa 1776 
3. Weakened, the Continental Army Runs 
On 2 September 1776, after the withdrawal to lower New York Island, 
Washington repositioned his dilapidated army.  Both Washington and the Continental  
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Congress still desired to defend New York.  To achieve this goal, Washington fortified 
his defensive positions from the Battery to King’s Bridge.  A lesson gleamed from 
Bunker Hill.128 
After taking 15 days to prepare for their next offensive, the British conducted a 
successful amphibious landing at Kip’s Bay on 15 September—the east side of New 
York Island.  In doing so, Howe believed he could force the rebel army to surrender 
without becoming engaged in a major battle.  The operation at Kip’s Bay was executed 
successfully with the British overrunning Washington’s thinly spread army.  During the 
operation, Howe chose not to press the offensive west to the Hudson, which would have 
cutoff the lower portion of Washington’s army.  Perhaps this was due to overwhelming 
expressions of joy by the inhabitants of New York Island to the arriving British troops, or 
to the overly cautious leadership of Howe.129  Either way the time allowed Washington to 
withdraw and consolidate his troops in the north at Harlem Heights, and successfully 
defend against a hasty British attack a day later.   
A victory at Harlem Heights for the Americans on 16 September was enough to 
cause more caution from Howe, but this time Howe’s prudence sent Washington 
sprinting to the Delaware.  Attempting to threaten Washington’s lines of communication 
with New England, Howe conducted yet another amphibious movement to Throg’s Neck, 
a peninsula just south of Pell’s Point.  Washington sent a small force to delay the 
extremely slow advance of the British.  The two forces met at White Plains on 28 
October, and again the British enveloped the flank of the defending Americans.   
Following the White Plains victory, Howe paused yet again.  This pause facilitated 
Washington’s reassessment, which concluded with the decision to maintain garrisons at 
Fort Washington and Fort Lee while the remainder of the force withdrew to New 
Jersey.130 
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4. Howe Gives Chase 
On 2 November 1776, Howe ordered a full assault on the rebel stronghold at Fort 
Washington.  The British troops again executed a successful operation killing and/or 
capturing over 3,000 rebels, while sustaining less than 350 casualties.131  Howe’s victory 
at Fort Washington, and Washington’s army turning south instead of north, only further 
convinced Howe to stay with the strategy to destroy Washington’s army.132  Rather than 
to continue to position himself up the Hudson in preparation for the future Hudson River 
campaigns, Howe chose to pursue the fleeing Continental Army.   
Backed by a tide of successive victories and seasonably warm weather, Howe was 
persuaded to continue his push against the rebel army despite the approaching winter.  He 
ordered his army to move to the Delaware River and was even entertaining the idea of 
taking Philadelphia before setting up winter camp.133  Though control of Philadelphia 
never materialized, Howe forced the Continental Army south across the Delaware, just 
narrowly missing another battle as the Continental Army gathered all boats on the south 
side, thereby containing the British on the north shore.  With this act though, Howe now 
commanded from Hackensack to Trenton and from Elizabethtown to Long Island as of 
26 December 1776.134 
5. The Strike to the Empire 
By late December 1776, it was evident that the Continental Army was in 
shambles, and in need of a morale boost.  Key rebel officers close to Washington 
understood the army’s precarious situation.  They recommended immediate action in 
order to renew faith in the rebel cause.  Washington listened to the advice of his officers 
and initiated planning for offensive operations.
135
  The resulting operation was at Trenton 
on 26 December 1776 and the effects were tremendous.  Within 45 minutes of the raid 
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starting there were over 100 dead or wounded Hessian soldiers–British mercenaries–and 
another 1,000 captured.  Conversely, the American sustained only four casualties against 
one of the premier fighting forces in the world, and crossed back into Pennsylvania 
unmolested and with greater morale.
136   
Washington believed that Howe would retaliate for his loss at Trenton and 
prepared accordingly.  Therefore, he sent a force back into Trenton and awaited the 
oncoming British force.  This second Battle of Trenton resulted in Washington’s forces 
decisively thwarting Cornwallis’ assaults.  Perhaps taking a page from Howe, Cornwallis 
paused and consolidated while Washington’s force slipped away.  Washington, in an 
effort to deceive the camped forces of Cornwallis, left a very small contingent behind to 
tend fires and make noises.  Under this deception Washington travelled to Princeton.  At 
daybreak, Washington’s army and a stay-behind force from Cornwallis’ advance to 
Trenton met for the Battle of Princeton on 3 January 1777.  Washington’s leadership 
proved to be overwhelming, as the British chaotically broke and ran to Trenton and New 
Brunswick.  Within days Washington’s forces would be camped at Morristown and 
Howe’s holdings significantly diminished.137 
The losses at Trenton and Princeton compelled Howe to concede a large portion 
of New Jersey back to the rebels—from Trenton to New Brunswick in the south and 
Hackensack and Elizabethtown in the north.  Even worse, Howe’s failure to capitalize on 
the opportunity of a decisive victory over the rebel army now began to call into question 
his abilities as the commander of British forces.138  Fortunately for Howe, his strategy to 
wield a big stick against the Continental Army was augmented by his simultaneous 
offering of ‘carrots’ to the population of the northeast. 
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C. THE CARROTS: HOWE TRIES CONCILIATION 
1. An Offer They Did Refuse 
British Parliament thought that the might of the British military located in their 
victorious positions on Long Island would weaken the determination of the rebels and 
compel them to accept the terms of the Howe brothers 11 September 1776 peace 
commission.139  This logic proved false.  The reason was that as the British were 
anchoring on Staten Island in July 1776, the Continental Congress completed the arduous 
and highly contentious ratification of the Declaration of Independence.   In the spring of 
1775, members of Congress who advocated for a Declaration of Independence from 
England were significantly few.  Congress recognized that rather then enter a war with 
England, the majority of Americans wished for reconciliation.   
Yet, America’s conciliatory hopes faded quickly when Congress, in February 
1776, received Britain’s Prohibitory Act passed in December 1775.  The colonists 
perceived the Britain’s legislation as an act of war in that it called for a blockade—as 
opposed to quarantine—of all American goods.  This perception was solidified when 
news of Britain’s attempts to hire Hessian mercenaries were verified.  A few radical 
Americans, such as Samuel Adams, began in earnest to push Congress in the direction of 
separating from England.   These individual efforts were bolstered when rumors of 
Britain’s peace commissioners never materialized in early 1776.  Left to their own 
devices, the colonies declared their Independence in July, and narrowed the negotiation 
room between themselves and Britain.  On 11 September, the Howe brothers hosted 
delegates from Congress—Ben Franklin, John Adams and Edward Rutledge—who 
desired British acceptance of their Independence.  The Staten Island Peace Conference 
was ill fated because, the Howe brothers were empowered to accept nothing less than 
subservience to British rule. Even more, Parliamentary authorities damned the Howe 
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brothers to failure before the conference even started.140  Favorably, Parliament did grant 
enough authority to Howe to facilitate his proffering of a proposal many could not refuse. 
2. An Offer They Did Not Refuse 
The opinion of Howe, as well as a few leaders in Parliament, was that offering 
conciliatory measures to the rebels and opportunities for security to the Loyalists, in 
conjunction with the controlled use of force to apply one decisive blow would be the 
quickest way to return the colonies to British rule.  On 30 November 1776, despite 
criticism from his closest advisors and during his advance to the Delaware River, Howe 
issued a proclamation ordering that all armed rebel groups disperse and Congress 
renounce its powers.  He also offered a general pardon to anyone who would present 
himself to an English official, swear allegiance to the King and no longer partake in 
armed conflict.141  The pardon persuaded thousands of New York and New Jersey rebels 
to join the Provincial Corps in support of the Crown.142   
To mobilize the support of the Loyalist contingent in the recently acquired New 
Jersey and New York, Howe established cantonment areas.  These areas, fortified 
through a series of posts, provided a location to rally Loyalists and provide them service 
in the form of civil law under the Crown.  A virtual and physical shield to rebel activity, 
the strength of these posts rested with the presence of the British Army.  Initially, the 
British presence would simultaneously build confidence and provide much needed 
security.  Later, the cantonments would be self-sufficient, which would free up British 
troops for other tasks.143 
On 21 April 1777, Howe offered another deal to the rebel colonists.  Desiring a 
superior turnout to that of the November proclamation, particularly in light of the losses 
of southern New Jersey just months before, Howe offered a plot of land, money and a 
general pardon to all rebels who agreed to serve a two-year commitment in the Provincial 
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Corps.  After a long cold winter and the difficulties of provisioning during the Forage 
Wars,144 Howe’s most recent attempt brought in “dozens of men each day,”145 which 
helped to augment British efforts.146  At the height of Loyalist turnout, Howe was 
completing his plans for the campaign of 1777. 
D. CLEAR—BUILD—OH, MERDE! 
1. Howe: Army New York to Rebel Capital—Philadelphia 
By mid-1777, General Howe finalized and began his new campaign plan that 
called for the capture of Philadelphia.147  Howe realized that if he could not decisively 
defeat Washington’s army he must strike directly at the epicenter of the rebel political 
infrastructure, a location Washington was sure to protect.  Howe believed that once he 
entered Philadelphia, Loyalists would turn out in droves in support of the British, and the 
middle colonies would move freely to the Crown.148   With Philadelphia liberated and 
Washington on the verge of collapse, or at least distracted, Howe confidently believed 
that General Burgoyne’s—a British Commander in Quebec—expedition down the 
Hudson would succeed.149  To ensure Burgoyne’s success, Howe, prior to leaving on 9 
July 1777, directed General Clinton—Howe’s stay behind commander in New York—to 
act prudently to support Burgoyne’s advance by only threatening the lower Hudson rebel 
posts—no order from the War Secretary ever was sent to Howe directing support.150  
Furthermore, Howe delayed his departure until he heard word of Burgoyne’s success at 
Ticonderoga on 6 July.  With the good news in hand, Howe and 18,000 troops made their 
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way aboard a 147-ship British armada and set sail for their landing site on the Delaware 
River.151   On July 30, General Howe summoned his senior officers to his ship to inform 
them that he had decided to change the infiltration site from the Delaware River to the 
Chesapeake River.  Howe’s decision was based largely on false intelligence provided by 
his spies and intelligence operatives, regarding the location of the American army.152  In 
his typical sluggish fashion, Howe landed on 25 August near Elkton, Maryland on Elks 
River.   
 
Figure 6.   New Jersey-Pennsylvania-Maryland Map circa 1777 
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2. Washington Attempts to Check British Army 
Washington watched the events of 1777 unfold closely. When General Howe 
chose to move on Philadelphia rather than link up with Burgoyne, Washington mobilized 
his army in New Jersey and began to push south towards Pennsylvania.  He positioned 
his army northeast of Philadelphia and west of Bristol along the Neshaminy Creek, and 
awaited Howe, whose location was now in the Delaware Capes according to rebel 
intelligence.  But as Howe sailed out of the Capes, the rebel intelligence network went 
dry, which forced Washington with the decision; either he march north to support 
General Gates or move south to Charlestown.  Fortunately, for the marching troops, 
Howe was spotted in the Chesapeake.153  At once Washington moved his troops from 
Neshaminy to battle positions southwest of Wilmington on the Christiana Creek.  
However, Howe did not accept the offer of battle and moved north, avoiding 
Washington’s army, to the Brandywine River.  Washington responded to Howe’s 
maneuver by setting a defense at Chad’s Ford on the Brandywine River, effectively 
blocking access to Philadelphia.  It was here that Howe’s 16,500 men, feeling confident, 
confronted Washington’s 11,000 men.154 
The attack commenced on 11 September when Howe’s army moved against 
Washington for the Battle of Brandywine Creek.  The tactically superior Howe decisively 
flanked and turned Washington’s northern defenses.  Washington’s hopes to protect 
Philadelphia melted, as did his defenses.  The results were devastating and the 1,300-
casualty stricken rebel army began a long retreat, which included a march through the 
recently abandoned rebel political capital.155 
3. Congress on the Lam; Hears News from Afar 
The details of the rebel loss at Brandywine did not reach Congress at its home in 
Philadelphia, but instead at its makeshift location in Lancaster.  On 18 September 
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Congress, fearful of the advancing British, departed the city and headed fifty miles west 
to the pre-arranged meeting location, and nine-day home of the Continental Congress, 
Lancaster, Pennsylvania.156  Convening only momentarily to receive battle updates from 
the military describing the events at Brandywine Creek and of Howe’s decision not to 
join forces with Burgoyne, the Congress moved to York, where news from afar arrived.    
In York, the Congress heard of good news and finalized the perpetual union.  
General Burgoyne’s Hudson River expedition, just two months after his victory at 
Ticonderoga, was dealt a serious blow.  The excruciatingly slow logistical supply lines—
resultant from Burgoyne’s poor supply planning—slowed his effort and allowed the rebel 
army commanded by General Gates to prepare for the coming conflict.157  Though 
Burgoyne took the field of battle in the first Saratoga Battle, it came at a cost.  News of 
600 British casualties versus half of that for the rebels was certainly welcomed news in 
Congress.  Even more enthusiasm would result from Congress’s completion of the 
document that became the thirteen-state de facto government system.  In November, the 
Articles of Confederation not only provided legitimacy of the rebel government, but also 
paved the way for further colonial cooperation.158  Between these enthusiastic events, the 
news of Philadelphia arrived. 
4. Howe Takes Philadelphia, and All Its Problems 
After nearly three weeks of skillful maneuver and counter-maneuvers, 
Washington was out positioned and left an open door to the biggest city in America, 
Philadelphia.   With little resistance, Howe’s forces entered to a few thousand cheering 
Loyalists.159   The outpouring of Loyalists turned to Howe for help in emplacing civil 
government.  Howe’s response was to create a “pseudo-civilian government for the 
surrendered city.”160  Though positions were created and manned, portions of the army 
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conducted much of the governing.  As Howe was building necessary institutions for the 
Loyalists in Philadelphia, security was becoming a problem. 
Inside Philadelphia, the civil government was progressing, but outside was 
another matter.  In a Trenton-like plan, Washington attacked the British garrison at 
Germantown, a location just seven miles from Philadelphia.  The 4 October battle 
resulted in Washington’s retreat.  Thought not to be the tactical victory that Trenton was, 
Germantown was at least worth its weight concerning strategic signaling.  Although 
General Washington lost the Battle of Germantown, he received high praise from France 
and compelled them ever closer to entering the war overtly.161   
His successful defense of Germantown, must have given Howe the confidence to 
decide on one last decisive engagement with Washington before the end of the year.   On 
4 December Howe ventured out towards Washington’s forces in White Marsh in order to 
lock horns in battle.  But after several days of skirmishes and failed efforts to find the 
flank of Washington’s army, Howe decided to return to camp.  Upon his return came 
career-ending news.162 
5. Saratoga’s Pivotal Results Prompts a Bid Adieux 
As Howe pulled his forces back into Philadelphia, and Washington directed his to 
Valley Forge, the news of the second Battle of Saratoga arrived.  Shockingly Burgoyne’s 
army had surrendered to the rebels on 17 October 1777.  The causes for this calamity 
were a lack of provisions, low troop strength, and the absence of assistance from some 
type of relief force.  The traumatic blow left Britain without over 5,500 troops.163  
The reactions to the British surrender at Saratoga were worlds apart.  Howe would 
pen his resignation before the years ends—perhaps to preempt Parliamentary inquiries or 
maybe to display his anger with them.164  Washington, on the other hand, surely knew 
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that news of this victory would be of service to the emissaries in France attempting to 
negotiate for a treaty, but kept at the task at hand and continued to ready his army through 
the eventless winter of 1777–1778.165 
E. HOWE OUT, FRENCH IN  
In February 1778, the French entered into an alliance with the colonial rebels.  
The Treaty of Alliance was signed for two reasons.  The first, rumors of British secret 
negotiations for peace with the rebels were abound, which spelled continued inferiority to 
the French.166  Second, the losses at Saratoga were too monumental a defeat for the 
French and they now decided to openly exploit the island empire’s weaknesses. 
The 1778 Treaty of Alliance meant that Spain was sure to enter the war as well, 
which meant that England no longer enjoyed undisputed command of the sea and needed 
to reassess her foreign policy.  The combined power of the Bourbons in 1779, after Spain 
officially entered, threatened the vast sea-based empire of England.  But even before 
Spain joined the war overtly, England’s vulnerabilities to the French Navy compelled 
Parliament to consolidate on that which was most important, the West Indies.167  
England’s new plan was to defend their holdings in North America with smaller numbers 
of troops than available, and conduct a strategic shift to defend their Caribbean 
interests.168  But was this strategic shift preventable or had Howe’s professed faults 
opened the door to a world war? 
Howe’s first strategy, which aimed at dealing one decisive blow to the 
Continental Army, devastated the counter-state, elated the state, and piqued the interest of 
the international community.  Though the rebel victories in New Jersey renewed the 
hopes of some of the radical leaders, the dilapidated army was decreasing in size and in 
morale.  After their arrival to Morristown for the winter of 1776–1777, the ranks were 
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depleted by deserters and by March 1777 the army numbered less than 3,000.169  
Observing the problem with desertion and recruitment, the Continental Congress not only 
passed recruiting legislation in May, but also strengthened future recruitment with the 
legislation of the eighty-eight-battalion resolve.170  But these prompt responses to the 
Continental Army drastically slowed in December when Congress left its seat in 
Philadelphia for Baltimore in order to avoid the advancing Howe.171 
Not only was business between the army and Congress slow, but also army 
operations suffered as a result of defeats and low recruiting levels.  Washington now 
understood that he could not defeat the British by relying solely on defensive operations 
from fixed locations.  Instead, through the process of reassessment he was led to employ 
what is known as the Fabian strategy.  Historian Russell Weigley concisely describes the 
essence of this strategy stating it is, “the erosion of the enemy’s strength by means of hit-
and-run strikes against his outposts.”172  The strategy fundamentally lengthened the war 
for the British, and any future attempt to draw in Washington’s Continental Army to a 
pitched battle would prove futile wrecked. 
Regardless of the Continental Army’s weakened state, the counter-state did have 
one productive force, the New England militias.  And it operated with impunity.  Howe’s 
over-focus on the Continental Army left the militia to their own devices, which meant 
that Loyalists in militia territory were terrorized or coerced into submission.173 
In January 1777, the British Parliament could have not been more excited, and 
that excitement took only a small hit upon hearing the news of the losses at Trenton and 
Princeton.  During the campaign of 1776, the English people viewed General Howe as 
the unstoppable British General who was crushing the American rebellion.174  On 8 
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December 1776, General William Howe was notified that the King of England had 
knighted him for his impressive victories at New York.175  The common belief amongst 
British leadership was that George Washington’s army would not be an effective fighting 
force for much longer.176  Upon receipt of the news of the end of the year defeats, some 
leaders and Ministry members believed the defeats to be minor.177  Furthermore, the 
leaders in Parliament took pride in their momentous accomplishment of fielding the 
largest expeditionary force of the eighteenth century, and went back to planning 
dutifully.178 
As 1775 came to a close, both the rebel colonies and Britain were looking for 
international assistance.  Washington’s success at Trenton and Princeton motivated 
France to increase covert material support to the rebels.179  Furthermore, France now had 
military advisors operating alongside the Americans and was providing Washington’s 
army with cannons and weapons.180  Despite concerted attempts by American emissaries, 
Spain only “adjusted its policy to a semi-covert system of simultaneously checking and 
resisting British expansion…”181   
Britain’s international fortunes were less invigorating than that of the Americans.  
Britain, on one hand, found diplomatic stonewalls in Catherine, the Tsarina of Russia.  
Wanting nothing to do with internal rebellions, Catherine chose not to support the British 
with their colonial problem.182  On the other hand, Prussian mercenaries were overly 
eager to wage Britain’s war in the colonies.  But by increasing British combat power, the 
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mercenary presence also fueled anti-Crown sentiment, particularly among those that just 
returned from Howe’s failed peace mission.183 
Simultaneous to his first strategy, Howe implemented his second strategy of 
conciliation.  This strategy met with mixed reviews from within the state, as well as the 
colonial population.  As the campaign of 1777 approached, the politicians of Whitehall 
began to question the ability of Howe to complete the mission decisively.  In the spring 
of 1777, the North Ministry received the results of an inquiry into the effectiveness of the 
conciliation strategy. The findings of the inquiry demonstrated that Howe’s strategy was 
ineffective in creating substantial long-term results.  Furthermore, many Parliamentary 
leaders in England were getting tired of Howe’s pardons, as the growing sentiment was 
one of retribution, not conciliation.184  England was so determined to force Howe to give 
up his conciliation effort and end the rebellion, militarily, as soon as possible that 
Parliament, once a staunch supporter of Howe, had chosen to provoke the resignation of 
Howe in August 1777.185  It had become clear that many British political leaders had lost 
confidence in General Howe’s conciliation efforts and questioned his ability to transition 
to a more aggressive strategy.   
Even with the growing discontent in England, the army in the colonies was 
growing stronger, but to no effect.  The growth of the Provincial Corps exceeded official 
expectation in 1776 and recruitment increased annually until 1780.186  However, the 
Provincial Corps never really lifted off, and was not actively promoted or employed until 
the defeats of Saratoga because of a lack of faith in the capabilities of the ranks of the 
unit.187   
The perceptions of the population, based on observing the events of conciliation, 
were varied.  To the portion of the population that were inclined to support the rebels, 
Howe’s conciliation measures, particularly pardons, certainly looked attractive, 
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especially since the rebel army had been chased out of New York very rapidly.  To the 
hard-core supporters, beliefs were certainly tested, particularly if you lived in the New 
York area.  Similarly, within the Loyalist population, perceptions varied.  The slow rate 
that information travelled throughout the colonies and the rare chance an individual had 
of actually recouping lost estates, dissuaded many would-be Loyalists from risking the 
trip to British lines.188  Also, those that did take advantage of the conciliation prior to 
Howe withdrawing to New Brunswick were now left abandoned or forced to relocate, 
which helped to splinter Loyalist confidence.  The portion of the population that was 
politically neutral traded one army for another.  The times of relative anarchy under the 
Continental Army were traded for the times of inconsideration under the British Army.189  
To this, Howe attempted to appease the people of New York by ordering his men to 
protect the colonists and their property and to arrest and execute any soldier caught 
looting or committing additional acts; but these were ultimately just words at least in a 
majority of perceptions already being solidified.190 
In the summer of 1777, Howe unveiled his third and final strategy of clear and 
build Philadelphia.  This strategy resulted in the dispirited population of Philadelphia, and 
a stupefied Parliament.  The dispirited population was a result of the lack of discipline 
and over indulgence of British troops while stationed in Pennsylvania, and their 
disinterested commander.  The Loyalists grew tired of an undisciplined army that took 
advantage of their position relative to the regular resident.  And a lack of heavy-handed 
responses from Howe further enraged townsmen.191  But Howe’s thoughts were 
somewhere else.  While Howe attempted to build civil institutions, the population of 
Philadelphia’s voices became too much for Howe to tolerate.  The intolerance was fueled 
not because Howe did not want to grow Loyalist support, but because George 
Washington’s army was his focus, and his belief that civil government should have been 
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an easy transition for a Loyalist only governing body.192   Like the population, others, 
across the big pond, had reason to be unhappy with Howe. 
The Loyalist population complained because they perceived that they were second 
to Washington, but Parliament could not complain at all because they were perception-
less.  The Ministry’s biggest complaint—voiced on multiple occasions—was that Howe 
failed to inform Parliament.  On more than one occasion, Howe went 30 days without 
marking paper to Parliament.193  These actions were not what Whitehall required, and 
went a ways in explaining the acceptance of Howe’s resignation. 
In the beginning of 1778, Parliament, with notions of Howe’s persistent 
conciliation strategy against the wishes of British leaders and coupled with the frustration 
due to the lack of information, accepted Howe’s resignation.  In the same moment, 
Parliament placed Clinton in command of the colonies.  His task was to hold the line in 
the colonies and at the same time expect diminishing resources so that Britain’s new 
global war initiatives could be handled.  The possibility of this task is outside the scope 
of this work, but Howe had left Clinton with an assortment of problems.  First, a large 
portion of the Loyalists in Philadelphia, New York, and New Jersey were now discontent 
and inactive.  This action provided the radicals with an excellent opportunity to target the 
area with propaganda in hopes of swaying or coercing the Loyalist population.  Secondly, 
Clinton faced a recently rejuvenated Continental Army that was controlled by a highly 
organized Congress.  Lastly, there was a disgruntled and divisive Parliament that he 





                                                 
192 Reed, Campaign to Valley Forge, 190. 
193 Mackesy, The War for America, 150–151. 
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V. FAULTS OF THE GENERALS 
“It is impossible to see even what I have seen of this magnificent country 
and not go nearly mad at the long train of misconducts and mischances by 
which we have lost it.” 
—William Eden, Carlisle Commission, 1778194  
A. DYNAMIC SHIFT 
In early 1778, General Howe received news of France’s entrance into the war on 
behalf of the Americans.  The event was momentous signifying the onset of a worldwide 
conflict amongst the great nations of Europe.  Furthermore, it placed the British Empire 
in a vulnerable position that required her to expend vast resources and treasure in an 
attempt to protect her global assets.  Fortunately for Howe, he returned to England soon 
after the news broke.  Yet, the overt decision of France and then Spain to enter into the 
fight would not have occurred had the British Generals, like Howe, not sustained 
significant military defeats, like the defeats at Trenton and Saratoga.195    
As the dynamics surrounding the contest in America changed it is important to 
understand that both General Howe and Gage cannot be solely blamed for losing control 
of the colonies.  Specifically, they are not accountable for an ambiguous and disjointed 
over-arching policy,196 and constrained resources.197  The reason why is neither officer 
possessed the capability to meaningfully affect these factors and therefore must be 
absolved of that specific guilt.   
                                                 
194  John R. Alden, A History of the American Revolution (New York: De Capo Press, 1969), 387. 
195 Officially, Spain never entered into a formal treaty with the Continenetal Congress to assist in the 
rebel war efforts against the British.  It did provide a significant amount of covert support to the rebels as 
evidenced in Chavez, Spain and the Independence of the United States.  In 1779, Spain joined France in the 
war through the Treaty of Aranjuez.      
196  For an argument that identifies that the British lacked a single over-arching policy, which in turn 
caused their failure: Eric Robson, The American Revolution in its Political and Military Aspects (London: 
De Capo Press, 1955), 151. 
197  For an argument that identifies the dilapidated state of the British military organization and how 
problems with recruiting and logistics and unclear structure of authority affected success in the War for 
America: E. E. Curtis, Organization of the British Army in the American Revolution (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1927). 
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However, the Generals can be held accountable for their actions and ideas 
concerning the translation of British policy into effective strategy.  After a careful 
analysis of the strategies developed and implemented by each General Officer three 
questions naturally arose when considering their culpability.  First, what was the degree 
to which each of the different strategies assisted the Crown in achievement of their 
overarching goal?  Second and most important, what were the mindsets and conditions 
that prompted the Generals to make such decisions?  Last, what prescriptions were 
available that would have allowed the different strategies to function as intended?  With 
these questions in mind we move forward to determine the faults of the Generals.   
B. ONE STEP BEHIND: UNDERESTIMATION 
The first strategy employed by Gage was political decapitation.  The essence of 
this strategy was to ensure that political appeasement and realignment occurred between 
the colonial institutions and the Crown.  The supporting strategy was to apprehend the 
radicals using the existing judicial and political entities.198  Expected was that the 
General Court would oversee the arrest of the radical leaders, thus separating them from 
the population.  To achieve this effect required that certain conditions be met.     
The reality was that not all conditions were present for successful implementation.  
Even more, those absent quickly overshadowed the conditions that were present.  On 
hand was an intelligence network that provided Gage with the information to target the 
radical leaders.  As for separating the radicals, he could have used two tools either the 
military or the existing colonial institutions.  Gage opted to use the latter to maintain 
perceptions of legitimacy in the eyes of the population.  Evidence of this is his 
proclamation that called for the arrest of rebel leaders to be prosecuted by the colonial 
judicial institutions.  Yet, missing was a unified predisposition within the institution to 
obey the Crown. 
Gage was one step behind the astute radical leaders when he selected to use the 
existing apparatus to apprehend the radicals, a decision with harsh ramifications.  He did 
                                                 
198 The idea of supporting/supported strategies within the McCormick Diamond model was discussed: 
Gordon McCormick, interview by Kristoffer Barriteau, David W. Gunther and Clifton J. Lopez, British 
Strategy, (October 25, 2011).   
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not understand that the existing judicial and political institutions were incapable of 
handling his assigned task, due in large part to fractionalization resultant from keen 
radical leaders.  Gage underestimated the pervasive anti-Crown sentiment coursing 
through the veins of the colonists that was generated by a few astute radical leaders. 
Though on one hand he did profess to know and subsequently requested 20,000 troops to 
restore relations forcefully, but in matter of execution, he sidelined his only apparatus 
from which he could have removed those catalysts leaders, and then entrusted the very 
institutions pervaded by radicals to bring the radicals to justice.  These results were 
catastrophic.  He simultaneously provided time, space and a coalescing oppression via 
proffered words to radicals.  His 13 years of experience should have better guided his 
actions…for this fault he cannot be absolved.  
To attain success in radical targeting, Gage needed to employ his military forces, 
in unison with the colonial institutions, to secure those persons wanted by the state.  The 
military was the only entity capable of compressing the time and space needed by the 
radical organization for continued growth.   The importance of influential leaders has 
been proven throughout time—even for Gage’s time—and must consume the time and 
efforts of those positioned against them.   
C. UNINTENDED MESSAGES AND OVER-FOCUS: PERCEPTION 
MISMANAGEMENT 
After the failure of radical targeting, Gage transitioned to an approach that 
attempted to disarm the rebels.  This strategy intended to prevent conflict by removing 
critical, yet limited resources from the battle space.  Resources that were, predominantly, 
located in the various colonial militia stores.  Nevertheless, prior to embarking on this 
particular course Gage needed to comprehend and ensure the presence of certain 
situational factors.   
The execution of the disarmament strategy needed to be conditions-based for its 




targeted resources.  Moreover, there existed a legitimate action arm, the military, which 
could execute the plan.  Unfortunately for Gage, he failed to realize that a critical 
condition was missing.   
 Absent was a proper understanding of how the population would react and how it 
would affect Gage’s course of action.  His failure to understand the population resulted in 
the transmission of the unintended message that the Brits are attacking what colonist’s 
value.  The actual message—seizing the radical’s ability to make war—was internally 
translated into the unintended message because of the absence of other information from 
the military commander.  His failure to foreshadow or anticipate the people’s reaction 
was a terrible mistake.  Colonial inhabitants felt that their liberties, specifically the right 
to defend themselves, were being attacked.  This sentiment coupled with radical 
propaganda proved most catastrophic and created a general sentiment of armed 
resistance.  These negative poplar responses compelled Gage to throttle back his 
strategy—a strategy that was hurting the radicals.  For these two conceptual faults Gage 
cannot be absolved.               
In spite of the damage caused by disarmament, this tactic was the first to actually 
harm the rebel organization because it attacked their major weakness.  What Gage needed 
to do in order for this strategy to succeed required the simultaneous implementation of 
two actions.  The first was to continue to press forward with his use of the military in 
seizing militia stores.  Second, was to shroud this decision with an information campaign 
that employed the existing social media tools to manage popular perceptions.  Acting as 
prescribed here could have mitigated the population’s anxiety and severely diminished 
the rebel’s infectious recruiting.   
Howe’s strategy, manifesting in the campaign of Philadelphia, failed for the same 
reason Gage’s anti-powder strategy did.  Howe’s last strategy was designed to strike at 
the legitimacy of the rebel organization.  By targeting Philadelphia he would signify to 
the rebels and the world that Britain was the only legitimate colonial authority.  In trying 
to accomplish this Howe moved his forces to Pennsylvania, cleared Philadelphia of the 
Continental Army, and held the area.  But like past efforts this plan would not succeed.   
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In this strategy, all required conditions for success were present, but Howe’s over-
focus on Washington taxed the support of the Loyalist.  Specifically, Howe’s fixation 
prevented needed attention to the population.  The time to build civil government never 
manifested and was constantly a point of contention between Howe and the Loyalists in 
Pennsylvania.  Furthermore, his fascination caused him to mismanage his army.  Howe’s 
soft hand in disciplinary matters created conditions that facilitated plundering and 
treating of the population as second-class citizens.  These actions facilitated divergent 
popular support for the Crown and the situation was never dealt with because Howe was 
always looking at Washington.   
Howe’s mistake was over-focusing his efforts on destroying the Continental 
Army.  Conceptually, Howe chose the right paradigm to achieve his end state, but in 
execution his over focus resulted in a disenfranchised population.  Howe never placed the 
required emphasis on managing the population, let alone their expectations.  The results 
were counter-productive to Howe’s campaign.  Desiring increased legitimacy and support 
for the Crown, Howe effectively decreased the Loyalist element in Pennsylvania by not 
fostering positive perceptions among the locals.  Howe’s perception mismanagement 
cannot be forgiven, particularly in light of his goal to decrease legitimacy, or in other 
words to increase the legitimacy of the Crown. 
To correct his error, Howe simply needed to place a greater amount of emphasis 
on establishing positive perceptions.  He did not have to give up the hope of destroying 
Washington’s army in one decisive victory, but he did need to relinquish the idea of 
executing such an action at the soonest possible moment.  If Howe had realized the early 
successes achieved in regards to supporting the population in both New York and New 
Jersey he could have employed such tactics in the Pennsylvania area.           
D. LATERAL AND HIERARCHICAL PROBLEMS: EXPECTATION 
MISMANAGEMENT 
The final strategy Gage sought to employ during his command was the building 
of alliances with the indigenous peoples of America.  In summary, this plan called for the  
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mobilization of the Indians in support of British war efforts against the rebels.  This 
action aimed to bolster the mechanism by which the state could effectively control the 
population.  
Successful employment of the Indians relied on one predominant condition that 
was never present—cooperation with other geographical commanders.  The British 
Commander in Canada, Guy Carleton, never employed the Indians properly because of 
trust issues.  Carleton believed the colonists, especially those situated along the western 
frontier, considered the Indians to be evil and savage.  However, the addition of 13,000 
soldiers, without question, could have bolstered British efforts.  And Gage who never 
made cooperation, or at least direct and adamant communication, with Carleton a priority 
suffered the want of 13,000 supporters. 
The fault of Gage resided in his inability to articulate the need of this force and its 
effect on achieving the overarching objective to his colleagues, or at least to the War 
Department who would then compel Carleton to employ the Indians.  Ironically, the 
employment of the Indians was a no-win situation for Gage because it would have fueled 
the already pervasive fear of Indians and further coalesced the colonists, but this event 
did highlight internal problems that Gage never managed.  Internal lateral 
communications were rarely, if ever conducted, between Gage and Carleton.  But, 
because the strategy may have ultimately hurt the Crown’s effort in America, this fault of 
Gage can be absolved only initially. 
Yet, Gage possessed the tools to correct his errors.  The prescription for this 
strategy was increased lateral communication with General Officers, Carleton in this 
instance.  Such communication needed to be direct and forthcoming to ensure there was 
no misconception behind what was required.  Additionally, Gage needed to inform the 
population of why such a decision was made.  The idea of open and direct 
communication between the British and the population always seemed to be forgotten by 
Gage.  
Howe’s second strategy—conciliation—failed for the same reason as Gage’s 
Indian strategy did.  The essence of Howe’s strategy is best captured in his own words.  
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Howe himself states, “My principal object in so great an extension of the cantonments 
was to afford protection to the inhabitants, that they might experience the difference 
between His Majesty’s government, and that to which they were subjected from the rebel 
leaders.”199  In trying to reacquire and/or retain the support of the population, Howe 
endorsed two separate, but supporting actions.  To the rebels, he offered conciliatory 
measures centered upon pardons.  As for the Loyalists, he provided them with 
employment opportunities as soldiers in the Provincial Corps.   
The strategy of conciliation possessed the necessary pre-existing conditions for 
successful implementation.  But unlike the previous strategies such conditions were only 
initially present.  At the outset, Howe properly employed and arrayed the army in order to 
support the plan.  His cantonment areas were developed and supported by Loyalists and 
the Provincial Corps.  It was a flawless plan in the process of flawless execution—at least 
internally. 
Howe had failed to include the most important audience in his plan–Parliament.  
As conciliation progressed Howe failed to continue to articulate to Parliament the 
successes he was achieving in New Jersey and New York via the Provincial Corps, 
pardons, and the army.  A lack of proper communication on the effects being achieved on 
the ground resulted in a frustrated Parliament, and even moved them to preempt future 
conciliation strategies.   Provided the incoherent policies, Howe’s calamitous fault only 
worsened the strategic situation, for which a Member of Parliament himself cannot be 
forgiven. 
The prescriptions necessary for correcting such errors and allowing conciliation to 
succeed were not overly complicated.  Howe needed to more adequately articulate the 
effects of this supporting strategy to Parliament through his own information campaign.  
Such an expectation management campaign needed to fully inform the civilian decision-
makers, if not to ensure a comprehensive civil-military approach to the conflict then to 
shade the government with any information. 
                                                 
199 Howe, “The Narrative of Lieut. Gen Sir William Howe in a Comittee of the House of Commons,” 
9. 
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E. CONSOLIDATE: FORCE MISMANAGEMENT 
Gage’s third strategy—consolidation—began in 1774.  The idea was that by 
consolidating resources in a central location the British military could better plan, 
prepare, and conduct operations against the rebel army.  Here was an attempt by Gage to 
grow and sustain his own limited force, but still be able to prosecute the war.   
The primary condition necessary for planning and preparing for an operation was 
information, and still is.  The same condition would also diminish as forces are removed 
from the population.  With the choice to fortify Boston, Gage defaulted control of society 
to the existing colonial institutions.  These institutions were heavily influenced by the 
counter-state and already proven untrustworthy.  Naturally, information would decrease 
as the rebels choked out the Crown’s population support in uncontested areas.  Even 
more, by reducing his signature, Gage provided the rebels with an easily identifiable 
target.  The rebels could easily monitor and track British forces using only limited 
resources to do so.   
Gage’s mismanagement of his forces disposition excluded his ability to plan.  
With relatively no access outside Boston, Gage’s informers were forced to develop 
means to get information through the siege lines.  As the information passing continued, 
the ever-adept rebels increased their capacity to intercept the messages, which precluded 
any effective planning from within Boston.  It is easier to forgive Gage for his force 
mismanagement provided the force protection response and his vast intelligence network, 
but not easy provided his goal to plan and prepare.  This must have weighed heavily on 
Gage’s shoulders as he went from a level of moderate information to no information. 
Yet, this approach may have worked had Gage employed the following 
prescription.  His decision to consolidate was not incorrect, but the extent to which he did 
so was his downfall.  The recommendation put forth here is that consolidation needed to 
occur at a lower echelon such as the Brigade or Battalion level—an action that certainly 
occurred in their day.  Elements of these sizes garrisoned in forts at strategic locations 
with sea access would have presented wider coverage and more information nodes within 
the predominately sea-based colonies.  By using his naval assets to their fullest potential 
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he could protect his organization.  More importantly, such actions would provide him 
increased flexibility and maneuver space while also allowing the inflamed Massachusetts 
population to calm down.   
F. AVERSION: RISK MISMANAGEMENT 
Howe’s first strategy sought to strike one critical blow to the Continental Army.  
In summary, this approach set out to deal the Americans a single, devastating defeat on 
the battlefield forcing them to capitulate to the Crown and give up all ideas of 
independence.     
All the conditions necessary for successful implementation of this strategy were 
present.  Howe possessed the necessary amount of intelligence on the enemy’s 
composition, disposition, strength, and capabilities.  The Loyalist networks that endured 
Washington’s occupation provided such information to him.  Furthermore, he understood 
how the population would react due in large part to the large swaths of Loyalists that 
resided in New York and New Jersey.  This was an assumption, but one that proved 
correct.  Lastly, Howe possessed the mechanism by which he could achieve his desired 
end state.  This mechanism was his army.  Unlike Gage, Howe actually possessed all the 
required conditions for successfully executing his first plan.  However, with that being 
said he still failed to destroy Washington’s army. 
The reason why this strategy failed was because of a single, major fault that was 
possessed by Howe.  This fault was his aversion to risk.  Any military commander, to 
include Howe, is provided a certain amount of latitude for inaction when he or she 
believes that their force is in a precarious situation.  Yet, what is not excusable is 
allowing over-caution to pervade one’s every decision, which is exactly what happened 
to Howe.  Repeatedly, he failed to make a command decision when it mattered the most.  
Also worth mentioning is how his role as peace negotiator affected his decision-making 
abilities.  Our sentiments are that the responsibilities associated with this role factored 
into Howe’s thinking, but it does not fully explain why he was unable to overcome his 
aversion and exude the required killer instinct.  This fault is easier forgiven provided an 
assumption that the rebels desired peace, thus needless violence would not help the 
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situation.  However, Howe’s presence at Bunker Hill would have surely cleared his mind 
of these thoughts, and therefore this fault, though the least disastrous of all, cannot be 
forgiven. 
To achieve victory over the Americans via this strategy, Howe needed to manage 
risk better.  He needed to overcome his inability to assume risk in battle.  This strategy 
was painstakingly planned and the commander knew of the risks prior to embarking upon 
the strategy.  Yet, lacking the steadfastness to see it through execution on Long Island 
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